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Abstract
ADOLESCENTS’ AND YOUNG ADULTS’ MORAL THINKING
IN TYPICAL EVERYDAY-LIFE MORAL DILEMMAS
by
Yoko Takagi

Adviser: Professor Herbert Saltzstein
This research examined adolescents’ and young adults’ practical moral judgments, specifically
their unique moral thinking in two interpersonal moral dilemmas. The basic philosophical
frameworks (deontological and consequentialist principles) were employed as tools for
psychological analysis. In Study 1, 42 preliminary groups of adolescents and young adults
(14-16 years and 18-21 years) provided moral dilemmas that they had experienced during a past
year. Among 42 dilemmas, two dilemmas (the homework and the video dilemmas), including
different types of conflicting moral issues, were selected as materials for Study 2. In Study 2,
234 participants (76 aged 14-16, 90 aged 18-19, and 68 aged 20-21) resolved the two moral
dilemmas on the paper-based questionnaire, in which questions were framed into two ways. Thus,
the participants provided 1) their spontaneous decisions and its reasoning from perspectives of
imagined moral agents and 2) their choices from nine fixed reasoning alternatives. The different
types of moral dilemmas and the differently framed questions elicited age- and/or gender-related
trends of young people’s moral judgments. Selected interesting results include: 1) The female
participants showed a unique decision style: “restructuring” the moral dilemmas/situations, and
2) The participants showed their relativistic thinking only when they were asked to select from
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nine reasoning alternatives, and relativistic thinking was evidenced more in younger (aged
18-19) female college students. Age- and gender-related developmental implications were
further proposed.
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1
Introduction
In the past few decades, the moral culture of adolescents has changed continuously and
dramatically due to changes in such factors as the structure of families and communities,
technological advances, and the socioeconomic system (e.g., Nunner-Winkler, 2008). Not
surprisingly, the moral dilemmas which adolescents face in their everyday life appear to be much
more complex and multidimensional than ever. In addition, as agents, adolescents have increased
opportunities to face new and complex kinds of moral dilemmas in their everyday life, and their
ways of approaching and resolving these moral dilemmas may have significant consequences for
their sense of self and their relationships with others (Hart & Carlo, 2005). However, relatively
little research (e.g., Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995) has been done examining the
process of adolescents’ moral judgments as active agents making practical decisions about
real-life dilemmas. As noted by Turiel (2008b) among others, research investigating such
processes is urgently needed.
In the current study, I hope to shed further light on the nature of adolescents’ moral
thinking, specifically on the process and developmental trends of adolescents’ moral judgment in
their everyday lives. Emphasis is placed on addressing the theoretical and methodological issues
in adolescent moral development that have sometimes been obscured in past research. In the
following sections, the theoretical and methodological issues permeating the research literature
on moral development will be outlined, followed by expanded discussions of the characteristics
of and issues permeating adolescents’ morality and its development. Finally, a somewhat
innovative approach to studying adolescents’ and young adults’ moral development will be
proposed.
Two Issues in Cognitive-developmental Approach to Moral Judgment
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Theoretical Issues
Lawrence Kohlberg’s seminal work on moral reasoning development began to
dominate the field during the 1960s, and a substantial body of work by his followers has
contributed to our knowledge over the past 50 years (Hart & Carlo, 2005). The approach is called
the cognitive-structural-developmental approach because of its emphasis on cognitive structures
rather than on content or underlying motivation. The approach is an extension of the seminal
work of Jean Piaget and ultimately rests on the philosophical approach of Immanuel Kant and
the seminal writings of John Rawls. Kohlberg and his followers focused on children’s and
adolescents’ moral judgments on standard hypothetical vignettes constructed by researchers. He
and his colleagues were not so interested in what decision was made. Rather, this cognitive
developmental approach focused on the reasoning used to justify the decision. Thus, for example,
researchers working within this framework would present participants (children through adults)
with hypothetical moral vignettes and ask them to make a judgment about a hypothetical
epistemic subject’s action (e.g., “What is the right thing to do?”) and to provide reasons to justify
their judgment. Based on these data, Kohlberg developed a very influential developmental theory,
involving the invariant and universal stages theory of moral development (initially, lowest moral
Stage 1 to highest moral Stage 6), in which he emphasized the structure of the reasoning (e.g.,
the relationship between rights and duties). Thus, Kohlberg focused on investigating subjects’
transformations of the organization of thoughts about moral issues, specifically what subjects
could provide philosophers’ term “deontic judgments” in their decision (Kohlberg & Diessner,
1991). For example, the higher moral stage is defined as the extent to which subjects can
organize their thoughts about moral issues in deontic terms such as general welfare, universal
principles of justice, and respect for the dignity of individual human beings. Thus, the focus was

3
on what philosophers term, deontological analysis and criteria, focusing on the nature of the act
with little or no consideration given to the context or consequences of the act, which in
philosophy is termed the utilitarian or the consequentilaist approach.
However, as Kohlberg himself admitted (Kohlberg, 1976; Kohlberg & Diessner, 1991),
this structural-developmental approach may have systematically scored down subjects’
contextual properties of moral reasoning in favor of deontic (rule-focused, justice-based) ones.
Thus, within this framework, subjects’ considerations of specific relationships with others and of
social and situational contexts in their judgment were not considered as important and central to
defining or describing their moral thinking (Kohlberg, 1976; Lammers & Stapel, 2009; Smetana
& Turiel, 2003). However, as others have argued (e.g., Murphy & Gilligan, 1980), it may be that,
in practice, people, including adolescents, rarely use abstract deontic terms while making
practical and concrete judgments and providing reasoning in their everyday life.
The first issue to be addressed in this study is whether or not the study of moral
development should be approached solely from one point of view (i.e., deontic). This is
especially true if we wish to investigate morality in everyday life.
Methodological Issues
While it is true that the structural-developmental approach has substantially expanded
our knowledge of moral development, this method, like all others, has its limitations. For
instance, the hypothetical vignettes researchers have typically employed lack the specific
socio-cultural and relational contexts existing in individuals’ actual lives. As individuals’
everyday lives show, morality reflects multi-faceted responses in various socio-cultural contexts.
As mentioned earlier, during adolescence individuals have increased opportunities to exercise
their moral agency (i.e., responsibly make their own moral judgments), and the moral dilemmas
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that they may face become much more complex and multidimensional (e.g., moral, ethical, and
legal issues, responsibilities, quality of life [e.g., Wynia, Cummins, VanGeest, & Wilson, 2000]).
Everyday-life dilemmas.

In fact, as previous studies have shown, the kinds of moral

dilemmas, their complexity, and the contexts/situations that children encounter in actual
everyday life would change as they grow. For example, Takagi and Saltzstein’s (2008) study
with young children (3-5 years) showed that the kinds of transgressions that very young children
and their parents actually encountered in their everyday life were substantially different from the
kinds of hypothetical transgression stories researchers typically constructed. The participants’
parents reported events qualifying as “disobedience” transgressions more often than the events
qualifying as “moral” transgressions (i.e., moral domain: moral harm and fairness), which
typically researchers have employed in their studies on examining young children’s moral
development.
Furthermore, a number of studies examining contexts (i.e., relationships) and contents
(i.e., issues) of adolescents’ self-generated real-life moral dilemmas have demonstrated some
interesting age- and gender-related shifts. For example, Yussen (1977) found that with increasing
grades (from 7th to 12th grade) the contexts of moral dilemmas tended to shift from
friends/acquaintances to family/authority, and that “interpersonal relations” was the most
frequently mentioned content of dilemmas among the adolescents. In particular, not surprisingly,
9th and 12th graders more frequently mentioned sexual relations as a moral dilemma than did 7th
graders (Yussen, 1977). Moreover, gender differences in contexts of moral dilemmas were found
among adolescents (aged 14 to 18): Male adolescents were more likely to focus on non-relational,
“self,” contexts (e.g., self-standards, upholding beliefs) than female adolescents who tended to
focus on relational contexts for their moral conflicts (Johnston, Brown, & Christopherson, 1990).
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Likewise, the extensive work by Walker, Pitts, Hennig, and Matsuba (1995) gives us a
general picture of real-life moral problems that individuals encounter across the life span (aged
16-84). These researchers examined 80 participants from four different age groups: adolescence
(aged 16-19), early adulthood (undergraduate students: aged 18-25), middle adulthood (aged
35-48), and late adulthood (aged 65-84). The researchers asked them to write down three kinds
of moral dilemmas: 1) a recent real-life moral dilemma they actually experienced, 2) the most
difficult dilemma that they had ever experienced, and 3) a prototypical moral dilemma. The
analysis of the moral dilemmas revealed substantially different pictures of the participants’
conceptions of the moral domain between moral dilemmas the participants actually encountered
(i.e., 1 and 2 above) and moral dilemmas the participants generated as prototypical (i.e., 3
above). The most frequent contents of dilemmas that participants actually encountered involved
relationships with others (e.g., spouse/partner, parents, work colleagues, friends) and issues of
honesty and substance use, which were more likely to entail personal relationships contexts. In
particular, younger participants (adolescence and early adulthood groups) reported moral
dilemmas concerning substance use and involving relationships with parents and friends more
than the older counterparts (middle and late adulthood groups). On the other hand, frequent
prototypical dilemmas across all age groups were the ones concerning abortion and life
preservation (e.g., euthanasia, suicide), which were more likely to entail impersonal relationships.
Not surprisingly, adolescents and older adults were less likely to be concerned with the issue of
abortion than young- and middle-aged adults.
Self-relevance and moral reasoning. As traditionally studied, research on moral
development within structural-developmental framework has placed the participant in the role of
observer. We question to what extent subjects can pretend to be moral agents in such standard
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hypothetical vignettes researchers typically employed. In addition, as much of the empirical
literature (e.g., Krebs, Denton, Wark, Couch, Racine, & Krebs, 2002; Lammers & Stapel, 2009)
shows, peoples’ construal of situations and judgments tend to be different, depending on whether
the situations of conflicting moral events are self-relevant. As Saltzstein (1994) has argued, a
moral dilemma and the situation in which it is embedded looks very different depending on
whether one is the actor making the decision or the observer evaluating a decision already made.
Conforming this Krebs, et al. (2002) found that the participants, aged 18-38, who were the
actors/first persons in real-life anti-social moral conflicts (e.g., stealing objects from work)
tended to reason about and justify their resolutions from a narrow, defensive, and self-focused
perspectives. In contrast, when they were the observer/third person in the conflicts, they tended
to give reason from impartial and idealistic, “generalized other,” perspectives. A similar but
developmentally interesting result was found in research examining 8th and 12th graders (N = 60)
(Leming, 1978). In the study, Leming compared adolescents’ judgments of actions of others with
judgments of own actions regarding two kinds of dilemmas (hypothetical and practical
dilemmas) with similar contents. Leming found that the participants used significantly higher
levels of reasoning when judging other’s actions than their own actions for both hypothetical and
practical dilemmas. Interestingly, 12th graders’ level of reasoning dropped markedly to a lower
level (i.e., stage 2) in judgment of own action in practical dilemmas, whereas such dramatic drop
was not the case for 8th graders.
This suggests that the second issue that needs to be addressed in the current study is
how to devise research materials that are age-relevant and closely represent subjects’ everyday
moral dilemmas so as to elicit their judgments as moral agents (i.e., first or second person’s
perspective).

7
Characteristics and Controversy: Adolescents’ and Young Adults’ Moral Development
Relativism and Moralism
One of the most intriguing, but controversial findings using the
cognitive-developmental approach was the appearance during late-adolescents’/young adults’
moral thoughts: of both relativisim and moralism (Turiel, 1974). The relativism expressed by
subjects represents their ideas that all moral judgments are arbitrary and relative, and this radical
relativism is expressed in “it depends,” whereas the moralism represents their somewhat rigid
commitment to moral positions on specific issues despite various circumstances (e.g., you should
obey rules). An extreme form of such relativism is the sometimes-heard judgment: “You can’t
tell others what to do… it’s their decision.” However, as noted, this sometimes co-exists or
alternates with a rigid adherence to moral rules. Thus, adolescence is characterized, for some
adolescents at some times, by an extreme moral relativity with an extreme moral absolutism.
Sometimes, late-adolescents and young adults are more open to the former, and their judgments
are especially sensitive to the contextual properties of moral dilemmas (Murphy & Gilligan,
1980).
There is no agreement on how the relativistic orientation of adolescents’/young adults’
morality would be explained developmentally. Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) initially treated such
relativistic or egoistic judgments/reasoning as moral stage regression of moral development,
because higher stages are supposed to be more cognitively adequate (i.e., better able to resolve
conflicts), and such regression should not occur in normal development. In contrast, Turiel
(1977) considered such characteristics as a transitional phase (a disequilibrated transitional
stage) for progressive moral development in which the adolescent is trying to master a more
complex and abstract mode of thinking to resolve complex moral dilemmas. Murphy & Gilligan
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(1980) interpreted the relativism as a developmentally advanced thought, and, importantly,
attempted to provide alternative notions of late adolescents’ and adults’ moral development to
Kohlberg’s. On the basis of their longitudinal study, Murphy and Gilligan (1980) found two
significant tendencies in subjects’ responses: 1) a tendency to display contextual and relativistic
thinking despite their abilities to justify judgments according to logical (structural) systems, and
2) a tendency to take into account the actual consequences of their actions within the context of
the dilemma itself. Thus, Murphy and Gilligan (1980) not only highlighted adolescents’ unique
characteristics of moral thinking, but also suggested the limitation of using deontic terminology
to solve actual moral problems; individuals need to consider the specific consequences of the
dilemmas rather than simply the instantiation of a deontic concept.
Gender- and Age- Differences in Moral Orientations
Through intensive interviewing of women contemplating abortion, Gilligan (1977)
developed a new theory of moral development accounting for women’s moral
dilemmas/concerns regarding their real-life experiences. Contrary to Kohlberg’s morality of
“justice,” Gilligan derived a mode of “care/response” moral thinking, which was supposedly
more commonly found among females, and developed alternative sequences for the development
of women’s moral judgment (Level 1, “Orientation to individual survival,” through Level 3,
“Morality of nonviolence”). Gilligan claimed that there are two distinctive modes of moral
judgment (justice and care/response) and that they are gender-related. A male’s moral thinking is
primarily oriented toward justice (e.g., rules, rights), whereas a female’s moral thinking is
primarily oriented toward care/response (e.g., concerned with well-being). Gilligan’s theory
rested on the assumption that distinctive modes of moral thinking were related to the conception
of self to others (Lyons, 1983) and early different relationships to parents (Gilligan, 1977).
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A research shift to testing Gilligan’s claims resulted in a substantial body of work in
the area of moral development. Two research paradigms are included in much of the research on
moral orientations. They focus on examining 1) gender-related predominant orientation (either
justice- or care- orientation) and/or 2) an intra-individual consistency of a moral orientation by
providing subjects different types of moral dilemmas (e.g., hypothetical and/or self-generated
real-life moral dilemmas) and/or different contents of real-life moral dilemmas. Numerous
studies have employed Lyons’ (1983) coding scheme to delineate two modes of moral thinking.
This scheme rested on the assumption that in the process of making moral judgments, individuals
may consider both justice and care, but usually use one mode predominantly. Therefore, in
scoring the number of considerations within either mode each individual presented was counted
in order to determine the predominant mode. Thus, theoretically and psychometrically, justice
and care modes of orientations have been treated as contrasting/distinctive moral dimensions. In
the following section, research on moral orientations employing real-life moral dilemmas will be
extensively reviewed by age, and then an alternative conceptualization of two-modes of moral
thinking will be proposed for the purpose of the current study. It is important to note that
Walker’s meta-analysis of 80 studies (1984) showed no consistent gender differences in moral
reasoning of hypothetical dilemmas (i.e., Kohlberg’s method) after socio-moral experiences:
education and occupation were controlled.
Early through middle adolescents. A number of studies examining early through
middle adolescents’ moral orientations (aged 11-17) revealed that both female and male
adolescents acknowledged and used both modes of judgment (Donenberg & Hoffman, 1988;
Johnston, 1994; Perry, 1995), despite the fact that female adolescents tended to consider both
modes more frequently than male adolescents (Johnston, 1994; Perry, 1995). Some studies found
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unique gender- and age-related developmental trends. For instance, in a study with two age
groups (younger subjects: 5th and 6th graders; older subjects: 10th and 11th graders) Donenberg
and Hoffman (1988) found that in decisions of real-life “interpersonal” dilemmas, female
participants of both age groups tended to give more care-oriented responses than their male
counterparts, and younger female and male subjects (5th and 6th graders) emphasized more care
oriented responses, though both female and male subjects shifted toward justice response with
age. Interestingly, a study by Lyons (1983) involving subjects aged 8 through 60 plus found a
unique trend in moral thinking among male adolescents. While they showed a great persistence
of considerations of care/response in real-life moral conflicts, they maintained a greater
consistency of consideration of rights across the life cycle.
Late adolescents through early adults. Similar findings of gender differences in moral
orientations were found from research on late adolescents and early adults (i.e., undergraduates).
Much of the research demonstrated no gender differences in preferences of employing one
orientation exclusively, although females were more likely to consider care in their moral
decisions (Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988; Rothbart, Hanley, & Albert, 1986; Walker,
1991). It appears that gender differences in orientation were more marked among middle or older
adult subjects than among younger adults. For example, Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson
(1988) examined subjects aged 18 to 75 years old (N = 72) and found gender differences in
real-life dilemma orientations only in the middle adults group (aged 30-45), but not in young age
group (aged 18-24). In the middle adults group, all males showed a rights orientation, and all
females (except one) showed a care orientation. As Pratt et al. (1988) suggested, however, there
was a high probability that the finding was partially mediated by differences in the types of
real-life moral dilemmas generated by male and female participants. In addition, there was
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generally a low intra-individual consistency in employing one orientation in real-life moral
dilemmas (e.g., Rothbart, Hanley, & Albert, 1986; Walker, 1991). However, it is worth noting a
small percentage of the subjects (N = 50, aged 18-25) used exclusively one orientation for their
judgments across three different types of moral dramas (i.e., hypothetical drama featuring justice
issues, physical intimacy drama eliciting an issue of caring, and own real-life moral drama)
(Rothbart, Hanley, & Albert, 1986). Although such evidence is sometimes overlooked, this
phenomenon may represent one characteristic of adolescents’ moral thinking: rigidity of moral
thinking.
Thus, as the above examples shows, a number of studies examining gender-specific
moral orientations have not fully supported Gilligan’s original empirical claims. Adolescents and
young adults tended to represent the two orientations in some way as resolutions of real-life
moral dilemmas. In fact, there were some age- and gender-related developmental trends in which
individuals apparently gave greater weight to a certain value over the others or showed one mode
in their decisions. For instance, from early adolescence through early adulthood, females tended
to employ both modes frequently. However, they appeared to use the care/response mode more
when they encountered interpersonal dilemmas. Interestingly, contrary to Gilligan’s initial
conclusion, male adolescents showed a greater persistence of a consideration of a care/response,
although males’ consideration of rights become more pronounced later in the life cycle. Finally,
although there was low intra-individual consistency in employing one mode of moral thinking
across different moral situations, a small number of late adolescents and young adults
consistently applied one mode in their decision. However, it is unclear why and how
adolescents/early adults weigh one mode over the other for their decisions. Examining such
decision processes and the nature of moral decision is worthy of further investigation. Lastly,
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because of the nature of the research method and measure that each research employed, it is
necessary for us to be caution when drawing our general conclusions concerning gender
differences in moral orientations. Apparently, gender differences, if existing, are complex and
context-sensitive.
Effects of contents of dilemmas on moral reasoning. A substantial amount of research
on moral judgments support the claim that the nature of dilemma contents predicted individuals’
modes of orientations (reasoning) better than genders did (e.g., Donenberg & Hoffman, 1988;
Krebs, Denton, Wark, Couch, Racine, & Krebs, 2002; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988;
Rothbart, Hanley, & Albert, 1986; Walker, 1991; Wark & Krebs, 2000). For example, Walker
(1989, 1991) classified the contents of participants’ self-generated moral dilemmas (N = 233, 1st,
4th, 7th, and 10th graders and the families) into two types: 1) personal (involving a specific others
whom the subjects have a significant relationship) and 2) impersonal and found that
personal-relationship dilemmas tended to elicit the participants’ response/care orientation,
whereas impersonal-relationship dilemmas tended to elicit the participants’ rights orientation.
Furthermore, Krebs et al. (2002) showed that types of moral conflicts involving specific others
(i.e., personal partner) affected the subjects’ level of moral reasoning (MMS: Moral Maturity
Score: Higher score represents a higher Kohlberg’s stage of reasoning) differently. In the study,
researchers asked participants (undergraduates: aged 18-38, M = 22.2) to write about the most
recent moral conflicts they had experienced with their partner and their judgments regarding
them. Krebs et al. classified the contents of the conflicts into four categories: antisocial, prosocial,
social pressures, and philosophical. Reasoning was scored highest on philosophical conflicts
(e.g., “arguing about abortion in abstract” [p.309]) and lowest on antisocial conflicts.
As domain theorists (e.g., Smetana & Turiel, 2003; Turiel, 2008a) have claimed, these
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findings could be interpreted to mean that social situational factors such as one’s own positions
in the relationship with others and its associated concerns would be one of the important
components that adolescents have to coordinate with other moral issues in their decisions. In
addition, these imply that researchers need to be cautious about the contents and contexts of
real-life moral dilemmas while revising research materials.
Re-evaluation of two modes of moral thinking. Some researchers have argued against
Gilligan’s theoretical assumptions of two modes of gender-related moral thinking and
orientations and proposed an alternative conceptualization of the two-modes. For instance,
Walker (1991) proposed his idea of the interdependent nature of the two orientations. He argued
that “both justice and care orientations are not only compatible, but interdependent, and moral
problems does not force a choice between justice and care” (p.358). Brabeck (1983) more
concretely re-conceptualized Kohlberg’s and Gilligan’s theories, stating that “justice and care are
then joined; the demands of universal principles and specific moral choices are bridged” (p. 290).
Thus, it is rational to assume that justice and care modes are not distinctive entities; rather, while
they function differently, they are embedded together in moral thinking. It looks as if justice and
care dimensions frame moral issues/concerns and provide solution of moral dilemmas in terms of
abstract principles (e.g., rules, fairness, justices, rights) and concrete contextual choice (e.g.,
welfare, consequences of action/decisions) respectively. Both functions may work
simultaneously, but sometimes one of them may work better than the other, which, perhaps,
depends on social/relational contexts of the dilemmas. Thus, we need to find “alternative new
frameworks” as tools to clearly capture such individuals’ unique moral thinking and to delineate
its processes and practical moral decisions.
Moral Comprehensiveness
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Several researchers have proposed the concept of “flexibility of moral thinking” and
considered it as one of important components of moral maturity (Denenbery & Hoffman, 1988;
Krebs & Denton, 2006; Perry, 1995; Wainryb, 1993). Besides the universal and contextual
theories of morality reviewed in the previous sections, some researchers have focused on
accounting for processes of sophisticated/advanced modes of moral decision-making in terms of
a larger cognitive framework. There has been little empirical work on examining this idea, and
there has been no consensus as to the definition of this concept (“flexibility”). However, I
believe that it is worthwhile to start exploring this concept and its meaning from a developmental
perspective.
Denenberg and Hoffman (1988) used the term, “moral flexibility,” and defined it as an
ability to solve moral dilemmas according to particular content. For instance, in their study of
early and middle adolescents (5th/6th and 10th/11th graders), “content-based flexibility” in
reasoning was found only among female adolescences (Denenberg & Hoffman, 1988). Female
adolescents considered social principles (i.e., abstract rules) when moral dilemmas involved
societal rules and expectations including law, but they tended to resolve the dilemmas by using a
caring approach when dilemmas involved only interpersonal relationships (Donenberg &
Hoffman, 1988).
Although domain theorists have not used the term “flexibility” extensively in their
empirical work, their integral conceptualization of moral thinking and decision-making appears
to pertain to the notion of moral “flexibility” (e.g., Smetana & Turiel, 2003; Turiel, 2008a; Turiel,
2008b; Turiel & Perkins, 2004; Turiel & Smetana, 1984). In particular, Smetana and Turiel
(2003) highlighted the importance of examining how adolescents coordinate conflicting
concerns/issues (e.g., moral, non-moral, other social, and non-social concerns/issues) of
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multifaceted moral problems and reach their own decisions. Turiel and Perkins (2004)
introduced a notion of “flexibilities of mind/thought” involving critical evaluations of social
conditions, which leads to context-variable moral decisions.
Krebs and Denton (2006) proposed an abstract and slightly different notion of moral
flexibility. They claimed that “the more tools people have in their moral tool boxes—that is, the
more morally mature they are—the better equipped they are to select the one that will enable
them to solve the moral problems they encounter in the most effective manner” (2006, p. 673).
Thus, moral flexibility is defined as having a variety of forms of thoughts and an ability to select
and apply the most effective and appropriate thoughts to a particular decision. Such ability would
be especially beneficial when individuals solve complex moral problems in their everyday lives
(Krebs & Denton, 2006).
In summary, on the basis of previous literature, “moral flexibility” appears to represent
two aspects of individuals’ moral “competence”: 1) acquiring a variety of forms of thoughts as
tools and 2) the ability to select/apply an appropriate tool and to make decisions according to
different contents or contexts (e.g., social situations). Accordingly, in the current study, one of
aspects of moral “competence” will be a focus and examined. Although at this point it may be
speculative, such moral competence may be observed in the following form: an ability to
consider and assess multifaceted conflicting concerns/issues in terms of different perspectives,
both in abstract and contextual (concrete) terms, and to coordinate them when making a decision
about complex real-life moral situations. In the current study, one such aspect of moral
competence is termed “moral comprehensiveness.” The question is whether such
comprehensiveness of moral thinking emerges in a specifically developmental manner, and how
well the thinking processes can be explained by several theories in the areas of social cognition
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and cognitive development.
Cognitive Styles
A mainstream of cognitive developmental studies is research on examining the
characteristics of thinking processes in the intellectual domain (e.g., Kuhn, 2000; Kuhn,
Pennington, & Leadbeater, 1983). Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000) has questioned whether
an ability to coordinate the subjective and objective dimensions of knowing would also be
developed in other domains in a systematic/progressive order: from absolutist, multiplist (i.e.,
radical relativisim), to evaluativist levels of epistemological understanding. According to Kuhn
et al. (2000), the evaluative level is the most mature form of thinking processes, and individuals
at this level are able to utilize objective criteria for comparison of divergent views. For instance,
within the value (moral) domain, when presented with two simple contrasting claims
(perspectives), individuals who are at the evaluativist level would claim that the two different
positions are right but further evaluate both positions and make a definite decision on the basis of
the better supportive argument and evidence. Individuals who are at multiplist level would claim
that each has a right to his/her opinion, and both are equally right. Kuhn et al. (2000) found that
the progressions from absolutist to evaluativist levels generally tended to occur across different
domains as age increased. However, in the values domain, both transitions (from absolutist to
multiplist and from multiplist to evaluativist levels) were more likely to be difficult for a number
of the participants. More than half the participants in each age group (5th and 8thgraders,
undergraduates, and mature adults), with the exception of 12th graders, remained at the multiplist
level. Specifically, more mature adults remained at that level than undergraduates. Interestingly,
one third of 12th graders remained at the absolute level; fewer 8th graders and no undergraduates
remained at that level. Kuhn et al. (2000) implied that the possible factors inhibiting individuals
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from developing beyond multiplist level were not only age and education, but also intellectual
climate and value prevailing in Western cultures, in which tolerating competing values was
considered a worthy ideal for individuals.
A large body of cross-cultural work by Richard E. Nisbett and his collaborators has
demonstrated interesting aspects of Westerners’ thought processes while resolving everyday-life
contradictions (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999).
For example, Peng and Nisbett (1999) provided American and Chinese undergraduates (N = 66)
with everyday-life interpersonal conflict scripts, including two contrasting values, and asked
their resolution to the contradictions. The researchers found cultural differences in dealing with
the conflicts involving two contradicting values. American participants tended to attend to one
side of values, blame the other side, and demand changes from one side to attain a resolution. In
contrast, Chinese undergraduates tended to attend to both sides of the values, to blame both sides,
and to try to seek a compromised resolution (what they called, “dialectical thinking”). These two
distinct cognitive styles were repeatedly found in research on other domains (e.g., perception)
and examined in other cultures (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Varnum, Grossmann, Katunar, Nisbett,
& Kitayama, 2008).
It should be emphasized that processes of moral decision-making are complex in
nature and different from other kinds of decision-making. Therefore, we should be cautious
when interpreting the findings reviewed above. In fact, the above two findings gave us a
somewhat different picture of Westerners’ thought processes while confronting with
contradicting values/arguments. However, this line of work offers us an important notion about
the necessary thought processes for integrated decision-making (i.e., attending to, assessing, and
coordinating the various aspects in order to derive a unique and satisfactory resolution) and
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valuable ideas regarding cognitive styles that people, in general, may use in their
decision-making. Such processes and styles appear to be relative to a re-defined notion of moral
comprehensiveness and to be worthy of further consideration.
Proposed Framework for Investigating the Moral Development of Adolescents and Young Adults
In an effort to grapple with unique characteristics of late-adolescents’ and young adults’
moral thinking, it is proposed to employ a new theoretical framework from the field of
philosophy: deontology and consequentialism.
These two types of theories, deontological and consequentialist, which are central to
moral philosophy, have thus far not been incorporated together into moral theories and research
in psychology in an integrated way. Theoretically, Kohlberg (1976) attempted to incorporate
both types of philosophical theories in the initial process of developing the four categories of
decision strategies in his moral structural scoring system. His “normative order and justice”
orientations focus on deontological considerations such as rules, roles of the social or moral
order, rights, duties, and justice, whereas “utilitarian and ideal-self” orientations focus on context
or consequences of the act, welfare, and interpersonal relationships (Kohlberg, 1976; Walker,
1989). In the final process, however, Kohlberg made a clear distinction between justice
principles and content aspects and abandoned analyzing the latter. With the exception of a few
published works (e.g., Cornelissen, Bashshur, Rode, & Menestrel, 2013; Greene, 2008; Lammers
& Stapel, 2009; White & Manolib, 1997), little empirical research in psychology, specifically
developmental psychology, has combined these two fundamental principles of morality. As
outlined earlier, psychologists who take the cognitive-developmental approach in the study of
moral development traditionally have primarily employed only a deontological framework,
which has limitations. In fact, as examples of highly complex practical real-life problems such as
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public policy issues show, we often encounter a situation where we are urged to provide a
concrete resolution and the reasoning behind the way we act. In such cases, there are limitations
to considering moral issues/concerns in terms of abstract conceptions (deontological principle)
only. Thus, we need to develop abilities to use both principles so that we could provide a
persuasive reasoning and resolution.
Accordingly, it is expected that employing these two different ways of moral thinking
in philosophy as tools might help us to uncover heretofore hidden aspects of morality. In
particular, it can help disentangle the thought processes of moral decision-making and capture
the development of deontological moral principles and context-based consequentialist moral
thinking in adolescents and early adults.
Theorists have slightly different definitions of deontological and consequentialist
theories. In general, these two classes of moral theories are usually considered distinct and even
irreconcilable. However, some theorists (e.g., Williams, 1995) have argued that they may be
reconciled or overlapped. What follows is a brief, informal description of the two approaches to
help explicate the rationale of the study.
Deontological principle of morality (moral reasoning).

Rightness of action is judged on the

basis of rules (e.g., law) or principles (e.g., rights, duties, justices) no matter what the
consequences might be (e.g., Williams, 1995). In other words, when making judgments,
individuals conceptualize and frame issues in terms of deontological terms: a) rule, social or
moral order and/or b) fairness, rights, justice, respect, etc.
Consequentialist principle of morality (moral reasoning).

Rightness of action is determined

by the consequences of the act, which maximizes good outcomes. Therefore, people need the
ability to flexibly assess/compute the potential consequences of actions by taking account of
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specific contexts and situations. The judgments would be justified by using contextual and
relational terms such as consequences of actions to the self and/or particular others.
In addition to examining tendencies of using particular principles in moral reasoning,
two unique forms of moral thinking, comprehensiveness of and consistent moral thinking were
examined. What follows are brief definitions and hypotheses of the two forms in this study.
Comprehensive and consistent moral thinking.

It is assumed that participants who possess

more comprehensive moral thinking attend to many aspects of moral issues/concerns pertaining
to moral dilemmas and express them “in terms of both deontological and consequentialist
principles,” employing both principles in their reasoning when they resolve a dilemma. It should
be noted that the second aspect of comprehensiveness of moral thinking defined in the previous
section (i.e., the ability to select/apply an appropriate tool and to make decisions according to
different contents or contexts [e.g., social situations]) was not examined in the study because of
the limitation of research design. Participants who endorse consistent moral thinking are defined
as those who employ the same principle exclusively as their reasoning while resolving different
types of moral dilemmas. Thus, comprehensiveness and consistent moral thinking are defined as
those who exhibit “breadth” and “narrowness” of moral thinking respectively.
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Research Objectives, Research Questions, and General Hypotheses
Research Objectives
The general objective of the current study is to investigate heretofore relatively
underexplored aspects of the nature of adolescents’ and young adults’ morality, particularly
developmental trends in their moral thinking and judgment-making processes as used with
typical real-life moral dilemmas. To this end, two aspects of methodology were employed: 1)
Two philosophical frameworks, namely deontological and consequentialist principles, were
employed as tools for psychological analysis; and 2) Two real-life interpersonal moral dilemmas
generated by preliminary groups were employed as “typical dilemmas” to be presented to
another larger group of participants, divided into middle adolescents (high school age) and late
adolescents/early adults (college age). This should allow for a better reflection of the complex
and multidimensional nature of adolescents’ and young adults’ everyday moral lives.
The current study focused primarily on “interpersonal moral dilemmas.” In an effort to
collect truly spontaneous real-life moral dilemmas from the preliminary groups, the concept of
“moral dilemmas” was broadly defined as including any situations/encounters in which the
respondent was unsure about the morally right thing to do. Thus, these situations/encounters may
include positive and negative moral dilemmas (e.g., antisocial, prosocial [help/altruism] events).
“Interpersonal” in the study means that a dilemma directly involves other(s) or, at least, has a
potential audience. What follows are main research questions and general hypotheses.
Research Questions
1. Spontaneous Judgments: How do participants resolve different two types of moral dilemmas?
Do participants tend to use a particular principle (approach) (e.g.,
deontological/consequentialist approaches, virtue) when trying to resolve the different types of
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moral dilemmas? Here, the focus is primarily on the participants’ spontaneous decisions as
imagined moral agents and the reasoning behind those decisions.
2. Moral comprehensiveness: Is moral comprehensiveness (i.e., breadth of moral thinking)
evidenced more in older participants?
3. Moral relativism and consistent moral thinking: Do participants show particular patterns of
judgments (i.e., a relativistic or a consistent pattern) when evaluating different types of
arguments for each dilemma?
Note. A consistent pattern (i.e., intra-individual consistency) was examined across two dilemmas.
General Hypotheses (Mainly Age-related trends)
The current study includes an exploratory method incorporating the basic philosophical
frameworks of deontology and consequentialism as tools for psychological analysis. Because of
the relatively little research in moral development explicitly using these frameworks as tools, the
following hypotheses were generated on the basis of previous research on moral reasoning
orientations employing real-life moral dilemmas and general developmental literature (e.g.,
adolescent cognitive development). Thus, the following hypotheses were tentative age-related
predictions. It should be noted that, while the primary focus of the study was age-related trends
in moral thinking, gender-specific trends were also be explored within the same research
framework. The numbers of hypotheses correspond to those in the research questions above.
1. Spontaneous judgments
With regard to spontaneous moral decisions, no specific hypothesis was proposed.
With regard to spontaneous moral reasoning, previous findings of research on decision-making
competence (e.g., Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman, 2001; Lewis, 1981; Steinberg, Graham, O’brien,
Woolard, Cauffman, & Banich, 2009) have shown a gradual linear developmental trend in the
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ability to consider potential future/long-term consequences of decisions (from 10 to 30 years old).
In addition, previous research on moral reasoning orientations found that the nature of dilemma
contents (e.g., personal vs. impersonal dilemmas; antisocial, prosocial, social pressure, vs.
philosophical) predicted individuals’ orientations better than gender (e.g., Donenberg &
Hoffman, 1988; Krebs, Denton, Wark, Couch, Racine, & Krebs, 2002; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, &
Sampson, 1988; Rothbart, Hanley, & Albert, 1986; Walker, 1991; Wark & Krebs, 2000). For
instance, Walker (1989, 1991) found that self-generated personal (i.e., interpersonal) moral
dilemmas tended to elicit the participants’ response/care orientation (e.g., concerned with
well-being). The moral dilemmas employed in the current study also included interpersonal
moral dilemmas (i.e., context of close friends). Thus, it was hypothesized that with increased age,
participants would tend to endorse a more consequentialist principle, but no gender differences
were predicted.
2. Moral comprehensiveness
In addition to the developmental ability to consider potential future/long-term consequences of
decisions, cognitive structural developmental theories (e.g., Kohlberg, 1976; Kohlberg & Kramer,
1969) have shown that some late adolescents/young adults develop higher stage of moral
thinking, namely abstract deontological properties of moral thinking (e.g., fairness, rights,
justice). On the basis of the findings and others, it was expected that with increased age,
participants would tend to bring disparate and comprehensive perspectives (“comprehensiveness
of moral thinking”). That is, the older participants would tend to express their reasoning in terms
of both deontological and consequentialist principles when they resolve a dilemma.
3. Moral relativism and consistent moral thinking
Two trends in moral thinking, moral relativism and moralism, are evidenced during the late high
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school and early college years (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Turiel, 1974). Some late adolescents
and young adults (aged 18-25) used exclusively one orientation for their judgments across three
different types of moral dilemmas (Rothbart, Hanley, & Albert, 1986). In the current study, it
was expected that some older participants (i.e., late adolescents/early adults) would show a
tendency to oscillate between definite positions in their decisions, typifying one of the
characteristics of moral relativism and that some other older participants would show strict
adherence to one kind of principle across the two dilemmas (i.e., consistent moral thinking).
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Design (Overview)
The study consisted of two studies: Study 1 (preliminary study) and Study 2 (main
study). Both studies included participants who were middle/late adolescents and young adults
(high school ages: 14 to 16-year-olds; college ages: 18 to 21-year-olds). Because life experience
factors—such as marriage and parenthood—are likely to affect gender-related patterns of moral
reasoning in real-life dilemmas (Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988), only participants
who were single and without child/children were recruited for the studies. The following is an
overview of the study.
Study 1 (Preliminary study): The main purpose of preliminary study was to select two
age-relevant real-life moral dilemmas (high school ages: 14-16 years and college ages:
18-21 years) that would serve as materials in Study 2 (main study). Forty-two participants
provided their own real-life moral dilemmas in written form. After receiving the written
form, the researcher individually contacted the participant, if necessary, to clarify his/her
description of their moral dilemma and to learn more about the dilemma. Two
interpersonal moral dilemmas that differed in the nature of moral issues involved were
selected to serve as materials in Study 2. A paper-based questionnaire including the two
selected real-life moral dilemmas was constructed. The construction of the questionnaire
was checked using a subset of the participants (N = 4) of Study 1. The participants
answered the questionnaire and gave their feedback as to its clarity. On the basis of the
feedback, some questionnaire wording was revised.
Study 2 (Main study): 234 participants, which consisted of three age-groups (high school students
[aged 14-16], younger [aged 18-19] and older [aged 20-21] college students), answered the
paper-based questionnaire consisting of two parts (Parts 1 and 2), each of which were
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designed to tap different aspects of participants’ moral thinking.
Part 1: This part was designed to tap participants’ “spontaneous” moral thinking. More
specifically, it was designed to examine unique developmental trends in their moral
thinking and decision-making on the two moral dilemmas.
Part 2: This part was designed to focus on the “stability” of the adolescents’/young adults’
moral thinking. In particular, the researcher assessed whether the participants
showed particular patterns of moral thinking, such as moral relativism or a
consistent pattern, after being presented with a set of arguments (i.e., pro- and
con-arguments constructed in terms of deontological and consequentialist thinking)
regarding the resolution of the two moral dilemmas.
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Study 1 (Preliminary Study)
A number of real-life moral dilemmas that middle/late adolescents and young adults
actually encountered with others in their everyday life in a past year were collected from
preliminary groups. From the dilemmas collected, two dilemmas, which included moral issues
that were typically encountered by the preliminary groups, were selected as materials in the main
study (Study 2). In the study, moral dilemmas were broadly defined as including any
situations/encounters where the participant was unsure about what was the morally right thing to
do. This contrasts with moral conflicts where it is clear what is the right thing, but just difficult to
do it (e.g., Saltzstein, 1994).
Method
Participants
A total of 42 participants (high school students: N = 16 [aged 14-16, 6 males, 10
females], M = 15.19, SD = .66; college students: N = 26 [aged 18-21, 12 males, 14 females], M =
19.92, SD = .84) were recruited by word-of-mouth through contact with friends, from youth
organizations, and from colleges in New York City. Participants were of mixed ethnicities:
54.76%, 19.05%, 11.90%, 11.92% of the participants were of White, Asian, Hispanic or Latino,
and African American/others, respectively. The researcher visited a research lab and several
classrooms at colleges and meetings for the purpose of recruitment and explaining the study. A
flyer introducing the research was given to interested participants and those who facilitated the
researcher’s efforts to recruit participants. The flyer emphasized that participation in the study
was voluntary. Interested participants contacted the researcher directly and provided their contact
information (i.e., name, birthday, e-mail address, postal address, phone number) so that the
researcher could contact him/her during the study. The researcher or the research assistants gave
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or mailed two sets of consent/assent forms (and parental permission forms for participants who
are 17 years of age or younger) to interested participants and asked them to return or mail the
signed forms to the researcher or the research assistants using the enclosed self-addressed,
stamped envelope addressed to the researcher. The returned consent/assent/parental permission
forms were counter-signed by the researcher, and the counter-signed copies were given or mailed
back to the participants to complete the transaction.
Material and Procedure
Each participant was given a packet that included directions for writing moral
dilemmas, several pages of written forms with the participant’s three-digit-ID number, and a
demographic questionnaire (Appendix A). For the participants who preferred to type their
responses, the form was given to them via e-mail. The participants were asked to write out one
moral dilemma (interpersonal moral dilemma) that involved him/herself and another person and
that she/he had experienced during the past one year. They were asked to answer three auxiliary
questions related to the dilemma. The participants were instructed to write out their moral
dilemmas with: 1) a description of the dilemma with a clarification of the situation and context,
including what the conflicts was about, who was involved (their relationship), where and when it
happened, and how it happened; 2) the resolution of the dilemma and the reasoning behind it; 3)
the moral issues they believe were involved in the dilemma; and 4) thoughts that they had while
trying to resolve the dilemma. In an effort to encourage participants’ spontaneous presentations
of moral dilemmas, however, the participants were asked to provide any moral dilemmas in
which they were involved had difficulty deciding the “right” thing to do.
They were asked to do this in private and to return or e-mail the packet directly to the
researcher or the research assistant within 10 to 14 days. After receiving a participant’s written
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response, the researcher contacted each participant to clarify his/her description of his/her moral
dilemmas and to learn more about the dilemmas. As all participants’ written descriptions were
clear and very detailed, and the planned one-on-one meeting for a clarifying interview was not
needed. Instead, several e-mails were exchanged between the researcher and each participant so
that the researcher could learn more about his/her dilemmas and/or clarify ambiguities in his/her
description. A $20 gift card was given to each participant who completed the study.
Coding and Inter-coder Agreement
For the purpose of dilemma selections, only a part of participants’ responses (i.e., the
detailed description of the dilemmas as experienced by the story protagonist) were the focus of
the coding. The researcher and her dissertation advisor read all dilemmas and developed a coding
system. The final coding system included four coding categories. Three of the coding categories
(1) content types (moral issues involved), 2) context(s): social relationship with others, and 3)
the participant’s role in dilemmas) were adapted from previous literature examining adolescents’
and young adults’ real-life moral conflicts (Johnston, Brown, & Christopherson, 1990; Krebs,
Denton, Wark, Couch, Racine, & Krebs, 2002; Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995). The
fourth (4) context: situation [i.e., a place where a dilemma happened]) was a category newly
created for the study (see a complete coding system in Appendix B). Content types and
context(s): social relationship with others were multiple-coded, if applicable. An inter-coder
agreement between the researcher and a graduate student research assistant was calculated on the
randomly-selected eight dilemmas (19% of the total). The inter-coder agreement across the four
coding categories was on average 87.5 %. In case of disagreement, the researcher and her
dissertation advisor jointly made a final decision.
Results

30
Frequencies of listed items of each category were computed by age groups (Table 1).
The results show that the most frequently reported content types (moral issues) across the two
age groups were “honesty/cheating/fraud (f = 12)” and “harm to other(s), group(s), loyalty to
groups, etc. (f = 12).” Dilemmas were typically reported involving “close (best)/intimate friend
or romantic partner (f = 17)” and ”friend(s) (f = 9),” and occurred in the contexts of “school (f =
15)” and “home (f = 9).” The participant’s role in the dilemmas was predominantly a
“transgressor (f = 32).” Only the results of content types (moral issues) and context(s): social
relationship with others were used as criteria for the next selection process.
Dilemma Selections
The following two steps were employed for selecting two age-relevant moral
dilemmas.
Step 1: Using the following two approaches (1) researchers’ evaluation and 2) objective coding
(using the results above), four candidate dilemmas were selected as semi-finalists.
1) Researcher’s evaluation: The researcher and her dissertation advisor read all 42
dilemmas and independently rated each dilemma in terms of the following four points: 1)
Whether a dilemma is considered a “genuine moral dilemma” (whether the author of the
dilemma had difficulty knowing “what the right thing to do was”); 2) Whether it would
be interesting to use; 3) Whether it is relevant for use with both age groups, and 4) with
both genders (Rating scales: 1 = Yes or 0 = No). The inter-rater agreement between the
two raters on a “genuine moral dilemma” was 78.38%, and the agreement on the other
categories was 75.24% on average. Two dilemmas, which the two raters considered
interesting and perfectly describing genuine moral dilemmas (i.e., a dilemma included
two conflicting moral issues [e.g., perfect duties]) and as relevant for use with both age
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groups and genders, were selected as semi-finalists.
2) Objective coding: Twenty-four dilemmas out of 42 included one of frequently
experienced context types (moral issues): “honesty/cheating/fraud” and “harm to other(s),
group(s), loyalty to others or to groups, etc.” Among them, two dilemmas, on which two
raters highly agreed on all four points and which included contexts of “close
friends/friend(s),” were selected as the other semi-finalists.
Step 2: With dissertation committee members’ advice on the final selection, two dilemmas,
which were distinct in the nature of conflict, were selected from the four candidate dilemmas.
Two selected dilemmas were a) “homework” and b) “video” dilemmas and were reported
by a 15-year-old female and a 16-year-old male, respectively. The “homework” and “video”
dilemmas include different types of moral issues that the participants might consider for their
resolution. For instance, the “homework” dilemma includes a conflict between perfect (e.g.,
cheating, keeping a rule) and imperfect (e.g., helping) duties, whereas the “video” dilemma
includes a conflict between two perfect duties (e.g., promise vs. respect, responsibility, rights).
On the basis of the two dilemmas, a paper-based questionnaire was developed for Study 2 (see
“materials and procedures” section of Study 2 in details). It should be noted that the researcher
maximally used the original text of the two dilemmas, changing only some wording for
clarification and the names of the people involved in the dilemmas. That is, no changes were
made in contents and contexts of the dilemmas. Both dilemmas include “interpersonal moral
dilemmas,” in particular, a conflict with close friends. The following is the gist of each dilemma
(see complete dilemmas in Appendix C):
a) “Homework” dilemma: My close friend (Tom/Ashley) has asked me to give him/her
the answers to our homework to get credits. Now he/she has gotten into a habit of relying
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on me.
b) “Video” dilemma: My friend (i.e., Patrick/Sandra) secretly told me a rumor about
another close friend, Jessica (i.e., Jessica is in a sex video). When I told Jessica about the
rumor, she pressed me to tell the source of rumor.
The ending of both scenarios posed a question of deciding what the “right” or “correct” thing to
do was. For each dilemma, the gender of the person with the dilemma (i.e., Tom/Ashley in
homework dilemma, Patrick/Sandra in video dilemma) was matched to the gender of the
participant.
The researcher administered the draft of the questionnaire to a subset of participants in
Study 1 (N = 4) (one participant from each gender- and age- group). The purpose of the mini
pilot study was to check construction of the questionnaire, specifically to make sure whether the
dilemmas would be relevant for both age groups and genders and that the questions could tap the
responses that the researcher intended to obtain. On the basis of participant feedback on the
questionnaire, some questionnaire wording was changed. Each participant was given a $20 gift
card for his/her completion of the study.
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Study 2 (Main Study)
Method
Participants
A total of 234 participants (males: N = 99, females: N = 135) were recruited from a
private high school in New Jersey and four public colleges (i.e., two senior colleges and two
junior colleges) in New York City. The participants comprised three age groups: 76 high school
students (aged 14-16, 39 males, 37 females; M = 14.74, SD = .08), 90 younger (aged 18 and 19,
33 males, 57 females; M = 18.47, SD = .05), and 68 older (aged 20-21, 27 males, 41 females; M
= 20.35, SD = .06) college students. High school participants were predominantly white (68.
40%), whereas college students were of mixed ethnicities; with a roughly equal make-up of
Hispanic or Latino (31.01%), White (20.88%), Asian (17.72%), and African American (16.46%).
The researcher visited the schools for recruitment and asked for voluntary participation. In
addition to obtaining consent/assent from the participants themselves, written consent for
participation was obtained from parents or legal guardians of participants who were 17 years old
or younger.
Materials (Questionnaire) and Procedures
The questionnaire developed in Study 1 (Preliminary study) was used. It consisted of
two parts (Part 1 and 2) (see Appendix C). Part 1 of the questionnaire was designed to tap into
participants’ “spontaneous” moral thinking—specifically, to examine spontaneous decisions and
the reasoning behind them. Participants were told to imagine that they were actually
experiencing each situation and dilemma themselves and asked to resolve each dilemma (i.e.,
“homework” and “video” dilemmas) as the imagined agent. Participants answered five questions
for each dilemma and several demographic questions. Among the five questions, the first three
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questions were devised to assess the participant’s spontaneous resolution of the moral dilemma
and his/her reasoning behind the resolution. The responses to the remaining two questions were
used as subsidiary information (i.e., personal relevance to the dilemma, difficulty in resolving the
dilemma).
Part 2 of the questionnaire examined unique trends in the participants’ moral thinking.
In particular, the researcher assessed whether the participants showed particular patterns of moral
thinking, such as moral relativism or consistent pattern, as defined in the previous introductory
chapter, after they were presented with other people’s nine arguments regarding the resolution of
the moral dilemma. Participants were asked to read nine arguments that other people made and
pick the one that they most agreed with. The nine arguments were devised on the basis of the
responses (i.e., decision, reasoning, thoughts, etc.) that the original author of each dilemma (i.e.,
“homework” and “video” dilemmas) provided in Study 1. The eight arguments consisted of four
arguments advocating one course of action (e.g., keep showing my homework to him) and four
arguments advocating the other, contrary course of action (e.g., stop showing my homework to
him). Four arguments addressed the decision with two deontological reasoning (i.e.,
deontological-rule/social or moral order & deontological-fairness/rights/justice/respect, etc.) and
two consequentialist reasoning (i.e., consequentialist-for-self & consequentialist-for-others). The
last (ninth) argument addressed relativistic decision/thinking (i.e., “It depends on what you
think”).
Each participant was provided one form of the questionnaires (i.e., four different forms
were prepared for each gender). The questionnaire differed in the order of presentation of the two
dilemmas and of the nine arguments in Part 2. Thus, the presentation order of the two kinds of
moral dilemmas was randomly counter-balanced. That is, one half of the males and females in
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each age group had dilemmas presented in the order “homework,” “video”; the other half in the
order “video,” “homework.” All participants completed Part 1 of the questionnaires for each two
dilemmas first and proceeded to Part 2 of the questionnaires and the demographic questions (i.e.,
age, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status [parents’ level of education], and religion
[optional]).
Coding and Reliability
Coding systems were developed to analyze spontaneous decisions and reasoning in
Part 1 of the questionnaire. In an effort to capture the unique nature of late adolescents’ and
young adults’ spontaneous moral decisions and their reasoning, the researcher developed new
coding systems separately for spontaneous decisions and reasoning.
Decision coding system. The focus of coding decisions is to examine how participants
approached or resolved the moral issues underlying each dilemma with specific interpersonal
context: friendship. Specifically, spontaneous decisions were coded as to how participants dealt
with or directly confronted his/her close friend’s request (i.e., Tom/Ashley continuously has
asked the participant to give him/her the answers to get credits [homework dilemma], Jessica
presses the participant to tell the source of rumor: Patrick/Sandra [video dilemma]). A coding
system was developed separately for each dilemma to capture participants’ unique moral
decisions on each dilemma. That is, the categories in the coding systems are not limited to simple
evaluative ones (i.e., positive or negative legitimacy); rather, each category represents a unique
moral decision. Each participant’s decision was coded according to a thought element and
classified by assigning it to a single coding category. The final coding categories of each
dilemma are listed in Table 2.
Justification coding system. New theoretical frameworks were adopted from the field
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of philosophy, deontology and consequentialism, for the coding system. The gist of coding
justifications is to identify the approaches/strategies by which the participants framed their
reasoning. As introduced in the earlier section, Kohlberg (1976) attempted to incorporate four
categories (two deontological orientations: 1) normative order and 2) justice/fairness/rights, 3)
utility consequences, and 4) ideal-self) into his moral structural scoring system. In the current
study, Kohlberg’s four categories were adapted and re-labeled as 1) deontological: rule, social or
moral order, 2) deontological: fairness, rights, justice, respect, etc., 3) consequentialist, and 4)
virtue. In addition to the four categories, after being examined the range of responses, categories
pertaining to “motivational force” (motivation central to special concern to friendship/social
relations [e.g., “Because you are my wife/friend.”]), “avoidance,” ”relativism,” and “others” (e.g.,
re-focusing/interesting thought)” and subcategories under deontological and consequentialist
approaches were added into the final coding system (after initially reading through and in some
cases, discussing the reasons, especially the unexpected ones). The final reasoning coding
categories employed for both dilemmas are listed in Table 3.
All thought elements given by each participant were coded. However, if a participant
was verbose and restated a response (e.g., “not to make his sad,” “not to hurt his feelings”), the
participant’s response was coded only once. As a result, more than one coding was assigned to
only 13.73% (homework dilemma) and 8.12% (video dilemma) of the participants.
Inter-coder agreement. Inter-coder agreement between two independent coders was
computed on a randomly selected 36 questionnaires (15% of the total data), which were stratified
by the age groups (i.e., high school students, two groups of college students [aged 18-19, and
20-21]) and gender (i.e., male, female). Inter-coder agreement ranged from 83.33% to 94.44%
(M = 88.19%). Inter-coder agreement of homework decision/reasoning and video
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decision/reasoning were 86.11%/94.44% and 83.33%/88.88%, respectively. Discrepancies in the
coding were discussed by the two coders and resolved. For further statistical analysis, some
coding categories, which had low frequencies, were aggregated or eliminated.
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Results
Spontaneous Decisions and Reasoning
The results of “spontaneous decisions and reasoning” (Part 1 of the questionnaire) and
“choice of justification” (Part 2 of the questionnaire) are presented separately. In an effort to
elicit participants’ spontaneous judgments, participants were asked to imagine that they,
themselves, were actually experiencing the situations and to resolve each dilemma from that
perspective.
Spontaneous Decisions
Descriptive statistics. For each dilemma, participants were asked, “How would you
resolve the dilemma?” Their responses were coded in accordance with a coding system
separately developed for each dilemma (See the details of each coding system in the previous
Method section and Table 2). A single decision coding was assigned to each participant’s
response for each dilemma. Table 4 presents the frequencies of participants’ decisions by age
and gender. Interestingly, no participants made a spontaneous decision fitting a “relativistic”
type of decision in either dilemma. For further analyses, three categories (Avoidance, Relativistic,
and Miscellaneous) for the homework dilemma and two categories (Relativistic and
Miscellaneous) for the video dilemma, which had no or low frequency, were dropped from each
coding system. As a consequence, four decision categories remained in each coding system and
were used for further analyses. Thus, the following analyses included three categorical variables
(age [aged 14-16, aged 18-19, and aged 20-21], gender [male, female], and type of decision [four
categories]).
Nature of decision. Several analyses were conducted to examine how participants
resolved the two different types of dilemmas (i.e., the homework and the video dilemma),
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specifically to examine possible age and gender differences in making a particular decision.
Log-linear analysis, a statistical method, is generally used to analyze data consisting of more
than two categorical variables (Howell, 2002) and allows researchers to determine which of the
variables and their interactions best explain the data (Howitt & Cramer, 2008) by generating a
best-fitting model.
Log-linear analysis was conducted first, and the results were used as the basis for
further analyses. In the asymmetric model of log-linear analysis, the variable “type of decision”
was treated as a dependent variable, and the two other variables, “age” and “gender,” were
treated as independent variables. However, the analyses revealed that 30% of cells (the
homework dilemma) and 25% of cells (the video dilemma) had expected frequencies of less than
five, which invalidated the analysis. Thus, instead, separate chi-square tests (age x type of
decision, gender x type of decision) were conducted for each dilemma with an alpha level of .05
to control for Type I error.
With respect to the homework dilemma, chi-square tests revealed that there was no
significant association between either age and type of decision, χ2(6, N = 229) = 9.68, p > .05, or
gender and type of decision, χ2(3, N = 229) = 1.42, p > .05. Because there were no age or gender
effects, the data for the three age groups and both genders were combined and the nature of
participants’ decisions was examined using a chi-square test for goodness of fit to test for the
overall frequency. The frequencies and percentages of participants who made a particular type of
decision appear in Table 5. The results shows that there were significant differences in
frequencies of the four types of decisions participants made, χ2(3, N = 229) = 121.13, p < .001.
Several chi-square tests were conducted as post-hoc comparisons to show a more complete
picture of the differences. An alpha level of .01 was used across all comparisons (an alpha level
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of .01 for multiple comparisons was suggested by Ruck, Abramovitch, & Keating, 1998). The
results showed that frequencies of four types of decisions were significantly different from each
other (from p < .001 to p = .003). Overall, the results indicate that the participants across the
three age groups and genders showed similar patterns of frequencies in four types of decisions.
About half of the participants (52.4%) made a definitive decision: “will stop showing my
homework.” That is, they would reject his/her best friend’s request completely. However, 34.6%
of the participants (“won’t stop” and “help/compromising”) indicated that they would share their
homework with their close friend so that the friend would get credits. The implications of the
results will be discussed in a later section.
With respect to the video dilemma, chi-square tests revealed that there was a highly
significant association between gender and type of decision, χ2(3, N = 233) = 18.25, p < .001,
Cramér’s V = .28, but no association between age and type of decision, χ2(6, N = 233) = 10.87, p
> .05. Thus, the results indicate different patterns of making particular types of decisions
between male and female participants. The data were further analyzed in order to find the exact
categories in which the gender differences occurred. Four categories of decision type were
analyzed separately using chi-square tests for goodness of fit with an alpha of .01. Table 6 shows
frequencies and percentages of participants’ decisions by gender and type of decision. The
chi-square tests revealed significant gender differences for the following two decision categories:
“alternative (restructuring),” χ2(1, N = 66) = 13.64, p < .001, and “won’t tell,” χ2(1, N = 233) =
7.04, p = .008. Overall, the results indicated a clear picture of gender differences in the
spontaneous decisions. That is, given the situation, the female participants made an “alternative
(restructuring)”(35.6% within gender) decision and a “won’t tell” (23.7% within gender)
decision more than their male counterparts. In contrast, the male participants made a “will tell”
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(56.1% within gender) decision most frequently. Thus, the results suggest that the female
participants may frame the video dilemma differently from male participants and in that way not
have to make a definitive decision. The implication of the gender differences will be discussed in
the discussion section.
Spontaneous Reasoning
Descriptive statistics. Participants were asked to explain the reason behind their
spontaneous decisions. Their responses were coded in accordance with a coding system
developed for both dilemmas (Table 3). The focus of the analyses was to examine “approaches”
that the participants used for their reasoning. As mentioned in the previous section, all thought
elements in each participant’s response were coded. Table 7 shows the frequencies of
participants who used specific approaches by age and gender. With regard to the homework
dilemma, a total of 266 thought elements were collected from 233 participants. 13.73% of the
participants (N = 32) (7 aged 14-16, 14 aged 18-19, 11 aged 20-21) provided more than one
thought element fitting different categories (31 participants and one participant provided two and
three thought elements, respectively). For the video dilemma, a total of 253 thought elements
were collected from 234 participants. Only 8.12% of the participants (N = 19) (4 high school
students [aged 14-16], 9 aged 18-19, 6 aged 20-21) provided more than one thought element (18
participants and one participant provided two and three thought elements, respectively). Among
19 participants, seventeen provided thought elements fitting different categories and two
provided thought elements fitting the same category.
Like the results of spontaneous decision, the descriptive statistics showed that none of
the participants provided spontaneous reasoning fitting the “relativistic” type in either dilemma.
With regard to the homework dilemma, overall frequencies (Table 7) showed that a
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“consequentialist/individuals (practical) (C/IP)” type of reasoning was also the most frequently
used by the participants (89 out of 266 frequencies). For the video dilemma, a
“consequentialist/individuals (C/I)” type of reasoning was the most frequently used by the
participants (92 out of 253 frequencies). For further analyses, categories that include no
frequency and the category “Miscellaneous” were dropped. Thus, one variable type of reasoning
included nine categories for the homework dilemma and eight categories for the video dilemma.
Nature of reasoning. The analysis, which included three categorical variables (age
[aged 14-16, aged 18-19, and aged 20-21], gender [male, female], and type of reasoning), was
conducted to examine whether the tendency of using a particular reasoning approach differed by
age, gender, and/or age x gender interaction. As shown in Table 7, three categories
(“Consequentialist/General/Social,” “Avoidance,” and “Virtue”) for the homework dilemma and
two categories (“Deontological/Others” and “Consequentialist/General/Social”) for the video
dilemma had such low frequencies, and these categories were excluded from the subsequent
analyses.
Binomial logistic regression was performed to predict participants’ employment of a
particular reasoning approach on the basis of age, gender, and age x gender interactions.
Binomial logistic regression is used when an outcome variable (i.e., dependent variable) has a
categorical form, specifically is dichotomous. In order to use binominal logistic regression, the
data in each category were recoded using 0 (no employment of the category) and 1 (employment
of the category). Thus, the recoded data (0 or 1) in each category represented whether each
participant employed the particular type of reasoning. Separate several logistic regression
analyses were conducted for each category for each dilemma.
Binominal logistic regression did not reveal age x gender interactions in any of
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categories for either dilemma. In addition, with regard to the video dilemma, no significant
models were found in any categories. That is, the results indicate that age and gender were not
significant predictors of any of the reasoning categories for the video dilemma. For the
homework dilemma, the following three logistic regression models were statistically significant:
Deontological/Rule, χ2(3, N = 233) = 27.44, p < 001, R2 = .11 (Cox & Snell), . 27 (Nagelkerke),
Deontological/Fairness, χ2(3, N = 233) = 20.94, p < 001, R2 = .09 (Cox & Snell), .12
(Nagelkerke), and Consequentialist/Individuals (practical), χ2(3, N = 233) = 13.75, p = 003, R2
= .06 (Cox & Snell), .08 (Nagelkerke). The results are shown in Table 8, and each result is
interpreted below.
Deontological/Rule (D/R) Age was a significant predictor in the model. Specifically, the odds
ratio indicated that high school participants (aged 14-16) were over 17 times more likely to use
the “Deontological/Rule” type of reasoning than participants aged 20-21. However, there was no
significant difference in using a D/R type of reasoning between participants aged 18-19 and
those aged 20-21. Thus, we may conclude that high school students were more likely to use a
D/R type of reasoning than college students.
Deontological/Fairness (D/F) Age and gender were significant predictors in the model. High
school participants (aged 14-16) were one-third less likely to use a D/F type of reasoning than
participants aged 20-21. However, there were no significant differences in using a D/F type of
reasoning between the two age groups of college students (aged 18-19 and aged 20-21). In
addition, compared to female participants, male participants were one-fourth/fifth less likely to
use a D/F type of reasoning. In short, high school students were less likely to use a D/F approach
than college students, and female participants of all ages were about twice as likely to use the
approach than male participants of all ages.
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Consequentialist/Individuals (Practical) (C/IP)

Age was a significant predictor in the model.

Age-related trend was found. The older the age group, the more likely the participants were to
employ a consequentialist/individuals (Practical) (C/IP) type of approach; Compared to
participants aged 20-21, high school participants (aged 14-16) were one-third less likely to use
this approach and those aged 18-19 were half as likely to use it.
Moral comprehensiveness. In the current study, moral comprehensiveness was defined
as “breadth” of moral thinking. Specifically, it was assumed that those who have
comprehensiveness of moral thinking would employ both deontological and consequentialist
approaches when they resolve a dilemma. As discussed in the descriptive part above, only
13.73% (N = 32) and 8.12% (N = 19) of the participants used more than one approach to resolve
the homework and the video dilemmas, respectively. Among them, 22 participants for the
homework dilemma (9.4% of the total participants) and 9 participants for the video dilemma
(3.8% of the total participants) addressed their reasoning in terms of both deontological and
consequentialist frameworks. In short, most of the participants did not employ both deontological
and consequentialist approaches when they spontaneously mentioned their reasoning. Chi-square
tests revealed that there was no significant association between either age and
comprehensiveness (“no using both principles” or “using both principles”), χ2(2, N = 214) = 1.22,
p > .05 (the homework dilemma), χ2(2, N = 217) = 1.23, p > .05 (the video dilemma) or gender
and comprehensiveness, χ2(1, N = 214) = 2.16, p > .05 (the homework dilemma), χ2(1, N = 217)
= 1.35, p > .05 (the video dilemma). That is, the participants did not show differential breadth of
moral thinking as defined in the current study.
Choice of Reasoning Approach
Descriptive Statistics
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In Part 2 of the questionnaire, situations for which participants were asked to make a
judgment were framed differently from the ones in Part 1. That is, the participants were asked to
read nine arguments that other young people made and to pick the one that they most agreed with.
Among the nine arguments, eight (four arguments advocating one and four arguments
advocating the other course of action) were addressed from four different types of reasoning
approaches: two types of deontological approaches (i.e., deontological-rule/social or moral order
[D/R]), deontological-fairness/rights/justice/respect, etc. [D/F]) and two types of consequentialist
approaches (consequentialist-for-self [C/I], consequentialist-for-others [C/O]). The ninth
argument involved a relativistic thinking (“It depends on what you think”).
The participants’ choices of arguments for each dilemma were classified and assigned
to one code from the five types of reasoning: 1) deontological-rule/social or moral order (D/R),
2) deontological-fairness/rights/justice/respect, etc. (D/F), 3) consequentialist-for-self (C/I), 4)
consequentialist-for-others (C/O), and 5) Relativistic (see Appendix D for the details of coding).
Table 9 presents frequencies and percentages of participants selecting a particular type of
reasoning by age and gender. Contrary to the results for participants’ spontaneous reasoning, the
descriptive statistics showed that 14.3% and 26.2% of the participants selected a relativistic type
of reasoning for the homework dilemma and the video dilemma, respectively. For the homework
dilemma, the most frequently selected reasoning approach was the “consequentialist-for-others
(C/O)” (selected by 63.0% of the participants). For the video dilemma, 51.9% of the participants
selected the “deontological/fairness (D/F)” approach most frequently.
Choice of Reasoning Approach for Each Dilemma
The following analyses were performed to examine age- or gender-related trends of
advocating a particular type of reasoning for each dilemma. The results were first analyzed using
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log-linear analysis. The focus of the log-linear analysis was to examine whether the pattern of
cell frequencies (in Table 9) could be accounted for by various combinations of interactions
between age, gender, and type of reasoning.
With regard to the homework dilemma, backward elimination produced a significant
model that included two two-way interactions: the interaction effect of age and type of reasoning,
χ2(8, N = 230) = 25.09, p = .002, and of gender and type of reasoning, χ2(4, N = 230) = 12.52, p
= .01. The model had a likelihood ratio of χ2(10, N = 230) = 6.412, p = .78 indicating that it is a
good model. To break down the effects, separate chi-square tests on age and gender were
performed for each category of type of reasoning with an alpha level of .01 as the cutoff for
significance. The results of chi-square tests indicated that high school students (aged 14-16) were
more likely to endorse a “deontological rule (D/R)” approach than either age group of college
students (aged 18-19 and aged 20-21), χ2(2, N = 20) = 9.10, p = .01 and that female participants
tended to endorse more a “consequentialist-for-others (C/O)” approach than male participants,
χ2(1, N = 145) = 11.59, p = .001.
With regard to the video dilemma, backward elimination produced a significant model
that included a three-way interaction (age x gender x type of justification), χ2(8, N = 233) =
19.03, p = .015. The model had a likelihood ratio of χ2(0, N = 230) = 0, p = 1, indicating that the
highest-order interaction was significant. To break down the effect, separate chi-square tests on
age and gender were performed for each category of type of reasoning. For the “deontological
fairness (D/F)” approach, there was a significant association between age and gender, χ2(2, N =
121) = 12.04, p = .002, Cramer’s V = .32. The results indicated that for the high school students
(aged 14-16), the male students were more likely to endorse a D/F approach than their female
counterparts. However, for both age groups of college students, the direction of the results was
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opposite: the college female participants were more likely to endorse a D/F approach than the
college male participants. For the “relativistic” thinking, there was a marginally significant
association between age and gender, χ2(2, N = 121) = 5.81, p = .055, Cramer’s V = .31. The
results indicated that females aged 18-19 showed more relativistic thinking, specifically they
were significantly different from the females aged 20-21 (χ2(1, N = 27) = 10.70, p = .001).
Patterns of Choices across Two Dilemmas
The analyses were conducted to examine whether participants showed particular
patterns of choices across two dilemmas. Each participant’s choices for the two dilemmas were
recoded according to the pattern and classified by assigning them to a single code, either a
“consistent” or “no consistent ” pattern. For instance, those who selected two arguments (one for
the homework and another for the video dilemmas) framed from the same approach (i.e., both
deontological, both consequentialist, or both relativistic approaches) were assigned to a code for
a “consistent” pattern, whereas those who selected two arguments framed from the different
approaches (e.g., a combination of deontological and relativistic approaches, of deontological
and consequentialist approaches) were assigned to a code for a “no consistent” pattern. The
results were analyzed using log-linear analysis first. Backward elimination produced a significant
model that included one two-way interaction: the interaction effect of gender and pattern of
choices, χ2(1, N = 230) = 6.11, p = .01. The model had a likelihood ratio of χ2(8, N = 230) = 9.73,
p = .28 indicating a good model fit. Table 10 presents frequencies and percentages of participants
by gender showing a particular pattern of choice. Chi-square tests were conducted as post hoc
comparisons to examine a more complete picture of the gender differences. The results of
chi-square tests indicated that the female participants were significantly more likely to show a
non-consistent pattern of choices than would be expected by chance, χ2(1, N = 163) = 10.31, p
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= .001.
Personal Relevance and Dilemma Difficulty
At the end of Part 1 of the questionnaire, participants were asked to answer two
supplemental questions. In the first question the participants were asked about the relevance of
each dilemma to them personally and to rate that relevance on a 5-point Likert scale (“Have you
ever experienced a similar situation?” 1: Never to 5: Very often). In the second question they
were asked about the difficulty of resolving each dilemma and to rate that on a 7-point Likert
scale (“How difficult was it to resolve the dilemma?” 1: Very difficult to 7: Very easy). Table 11
presents the means and standard deviations of the participants’ ratings by age and gender.
Separate 2 x 3 between-subject ANOVAs for each dilemma were conducted with “personal
relevance” and “difficulty” as the dependent variables and age and gender as the independent
variables. The two-way ANOVAs revealed one significant main effect: Only for the homework
dilemma, a significant main effect for age on difficulty was found, F(2, 227) = 5.18, p = .006,
partial η2 = .04 . The significant effect was further analyzed using Tukey’s honestly significant
difference (HSD) comparisons (p < .05). The results revealed that high school students (aged
14-16) (M = 5.45, SD = 1.54) thought that the homework dilemma was easier to resolve than the
college students did (aged 18-19 [M = 4.71, SD = 1.46], aged 20-21 [M = 4.72, SD = 1.64]). In
short, on average the participants had experienced a situation similar to the homework dilemma
‘at least every once in a while,’ but had ‘rarely’ experienced a similar situation to the video
dilemma. With regard to difficulty in resolving the video dilemma, however, on average the
participants reported it was ‘somewhat difficult’ or ‘neither difficult nor easy.’ These findings
were used as subsidiary information for helping the researcher discuss general findings.
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Discussion
The goal of the present study was to investigate adolescents’ and young adults’
practical moral judgments, specifically their moral thinking in everyday kinds of moral conflicts.
To accomplish the goal, two underexplored aspects of methodology were incorporated into the
study.
First, two philosophical frameworks (deontological and consequentialist principles)
were employed as tools for psychological analysis. This is, to my knowledge, one of the first
attempts of this kind in psychological research on “moral development.” The majority of
adolescents’ and young adults’ spontaneous moral reasoning fit into one of the two original
frameworks. However, as some philosophers (e.g., Mooney, 2011a, 2011b) and, psychologists, E.
Turiel (personal communication, 2010) have suggested, the two philosophical frameworks were
not sufficient to thoroughly capture people’s moral reasoning. As a consequence, I added several
other coding categories (i.e., virtue, motivation central to special concern to friendship/social
relations, avoidance, relativistic thinking, other kinds of reasons [e.g., reasonable thoughts]),
based on past research (e.g., Kohlberg, 1976), theories (e.g., Leah, 1988; Mooney, 2011a, 2011b),
and especially on the participants’ actual and sometimes unanticipated responses (reasoning). In
short, the attempt was moderately successful.
Second, in an effort to maximally elicit young people’s moral thinking, the research
materials (i.e., two “interpersonal” moral dilemmas) were carefully selected from moral
dilemmas generated by preliminary groups of adolescents and young adults (Study 1). The
selected two dilemmas (the homework and the video dilemmas) included the same
social-relationship context, “close friend(s),” but involved the different kinds of moral issues.
That is, the homework dilemma includes perfect duties (e.g., cheating) vs. imperfect duties (e.g.,
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helping), and the video dilemma includes perfect duties (e.g., promise) vs. perfect duties (e.g.,
respect, rights, responsibility). Despite the fact that the participants (in Study 2) had rarely
experienced a situation similar to the video dilemma, they reported that they could resolve the
dilemma without great difficulty. Because of the ubiquity of electronic devices and the Internet,
people can easily take videos everywhere and post them for public view. Thus, it may be that the
participants could imagine such a situation occurring in their own lives. Overall, I believe that
the two selected moral dilemmas included issues that adolescents and young adults might face
anytime in our complex and multifaceted society, and thus, appropriately elicited the participants’
practical moral judgments.
Spontaneous Decisions
One unexpected but interesting gender-related trend was found in participants’
decisions on the video dilemma. The female participants were more likely to make an
“alternative (restructuring) decision” (e.g., “I would tell Jessica not to try to find out who told me
about the video, but to talk to the person who made the video and is showing it to other people;”
“I would ask Jessica why she sent the tape and why it mattered who told me”) than their male
counterparts. The female participants’ decision style suggests that they were trying to
grasp/frame the whole picture of the dilemma first, before re-interpreting and/or re-structuring
the dilemma itself. One possibility is that such a decision-making approach represents a
“sophisticated” cognitive strategy, but which attempts to (adaptively) avoid making a definitive
decision or has some other function (e.g., speech acts [Much & Shweder, 1978]). In contrast, the
male participants tended to make a definitive decision, “will tell” (e.g., “Tell her it was Patrick
that told me”). Readers might think that the gender of the victim in the dilemma (i.e., Jessica is
rumored to be in the sex video) could explain the gender-differences in decisions. For instance,
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female participants might have more sympathy for Jessica. If female participants had thought so,
they would have told Jessica (victim) the name of the person (i.e., Sandra), who secretly told
them about the video. In fact, however, about 60% of female participants’ decisions involved
were either an “alternative (restructuring)” or a “won’t tell” decision, whereas only 33% of male
participants made such decisions. In addition, no such a gender-related trend was evidenced with
regard to the homework dilemma. Accordingly, one possible interpretation of the gender-related
trend would be that the complex and sensitive nature of the moral issues and social relationships
involved in the video dilemma may have led the female participants to approach the dilemma
with such a “radical” strategy. Clearly, further research is needed to confirm such gender
differences in moral decisions (e.g., research including a dilemma with a male victim) and
determine when and how such gender-specific development emerges.
With regard to the homework dilemma, while no age- and/or gender-related trends
were found, there was an interesting implication of the pattern of responses. Academic
dishonesty (e.g., cheating) and plagiarism often result in serious academic penalties. However,
the results of the current study indicate that individual adolescents and young adults think of
“academic cheating” in different ways. Although about half of the participants made a definitive
decision (“will stop showing homework”), about 30% of the participants made a
“help/compromising” decision (e.g., “Time to time is ok, but not always.” “Do together.” “We
would split the workload.”). About the 30% might think that helping, tutoring, or partially
showing homework is not considered “cheating/breaking a rule.” As Perkins and Turiel (2007)
suggest, it may be that their moral decisions are reflections of their social relationship (i.e., close
friend) and the particular social situations. That is, it pits a deontological concern for fairness
with consequentialist concern for helping, in Kant’s terms, a perfect vs. an imperfect duties of
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helping. Hence, the participants may have made an adaptive decision to temporarily avoid
making a definitive decision. It is thus interesting that the findings do not reveal any gender
differences.
Spontaneous Reasoning
One of the issues addressed in the study was whether or not the study of moral
development should be approached from one point of view (i.e., deontic), especially if we wish
to investigate morality in everyday life. The current study clearly supports the notion that deontic
terminology alone is not sufficient to solve actual moral problems (e.g., Murphy & Gilligan,
1980). I believe that the newly developed coding systems, which incorporate the basic
philosophical frameworks (deontology and consequentialism) and other categories, successfully
captured the participants’ practical reasoning behind their judgments. The results provide
evidence that overall (frequencies aggregated across the three age groups and both genders) the
participants’ spontaneous reasoning was framed most frequently by a consequentialist approach
for both dilemmas (specifically, consequentialist/individuals (practical) [C/IP] for the homework
dilemma and consequentialist/individual [C/I] for the video dilemmas). That is, the participants
framed their reasoning in terms of focusing on the effects of the consequences of own actions
(i.e., decisions) on self, other persons, and social relationships.
Moreover, the coding systems captured subtle but interesting age- and gender-related
trends in adolescents’ and young adults’ moral reasoning, specifically in the homework dilemma.
First, the older the age groups were, the more they were likely to employ a
consequentialist/individuals (practical) (C/IP) approach. This was consistent with the initial
hypothesis. The category C/IP represents the participants’ “practical concerns” for the
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consequences of Tom/Ashley’s academic performance (e.g., “She needs to do her own work to
learn the materials and do well on tests/quizzes”).
Second, high school students (aged 14-16) were more likely to use a deontological-rule
(D/R) approach and less likely to use a deontological-fairness (D/F) approach than college
students (aged 18-21). That is, high school students (aged 14-16) tended to frame their reasoning
in terms of concerns with rules and moral/social orders more than the college students framed.
Developmentally, the set of findings seems to be consistent with Kohlberg’s stage theory of
moral development. (It should be noted, however, that the categories, deontological-rule and
deontological-fairness, are not identical with Kohlberg’s stage 3/4 and 5/6, respectively.)
Another possible explanation would be that the age-related trends could be partially accounted
for by the academic environment in which the high school students (aged 14-16) are situated (i.e.,
the high school has a very strict honor code regarding cheating). Thus, the high school students
(aged 14-16) may strictly pay attention to the rule issue in the dilemma because of the strength of
the “honor code” and the consequences of violating it (expulsion). High school students’
decisions were reflected on their rating on dilemma difficulty. The results show that high school
students (aged 14-16) thought that the homework dilemma was easier to solve than the college
students did. In contrast, for college students (aged 18-21), it may be that the moral issues
involved in the homework dilemma might not as simple. Individual college students may try to
solve the moral problems in ways that are not restricted to the particular rules of their school.
Third, an interesting gender-related trend was evidenced in a deontological/fairness
(D/F) approach. The female participants were more likely to use the D/F approach than male
participants. However, this gender-related trend in reasoning disappeared once the female
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participants were asked to select one of arguments that other people made to resolve the
homework dilemma, which will be discussed in the next section.
Choice of Reasoning Approach - Switching Tendency
Another issue addressed in the current study is the importance of devising research
materials that differentiate between young people’s moral thinking as agents (i.e., first person
perspective) and as observers (i.e., third person perspective). It appears that the research design
of Part 2 of the questionnaire could partially tap into different aspects of an individual’s moral
thinking. The participants’ reasoning tends to differ when the researcher provided them
“interventions.” Thus, the results of the current study suggest that the participants were likely to
select a different approach from their spontaneous one when they were given a series of nine
fixed reasoning alternatives and asked to select one of them.
With regard to the homework dilemma, such a “switching” tendency was more likely
to be found in the female participants’ choices. As described above, the female participants were
more likely to frame their spontaneous “actors” reasoning in terms of the deontological/fairness
(D/F) approach than the male counterparts did. However, choosing from among fixed
alternatives, the female participants were more likely to select a “consequentialist-for-others
(C/O)” approach (i.e., “she needs to keep up her grades;” “I want my friend to learn the materials
by herself”) more than the male counterparts did.
Such a “switching” tendency was also found with regard to the video dilemma.
Inconsistent with the hypothesis, no age- and/or gender-related trend was found in the
spontaneous reasoning: overall, a “consequentialist/individuals (C/I)” type of reasoning was the
most frequently used by the participants. Thus, spontaneous reasoning behind the participants’
decisions was framed through concern for consequences to self, other persons, and social
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relationships (friendship). However, once the participants were in a situation where they had to
select one from nine fixed reasoning alternatives, they selected a “deontological/fairness (D/F)”
approach most frequently (“Jessica has a right to know who spread the rumor;” “Keeping the
promise shows respect for Patrick”). Furthermore, among college students, younger and older
female college participants (aged 18-21) were, somewhat surprisingly, more likely to endorse the
“deontological/fairness (D/F)” approach than the male college counterparts, whereas among high
school students (aged 14-16) the gender-related trend was in the opposite direction (i.e., male
high school students were more likely to endorse the D/F approach than female high school
students).
Although moral relativism has been evidenced in some studies of
late-adolescents/young adults (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Turiel, 1974), there has been little
developmental research further examining this intriguing finding. The following three main
results obtained from this study may have important developmental implications with regard to
adolescents’ and young adults’ moral relativism:
1) Relativistic thinking was evidenced only when the participants were asked to select one of
nine reasoning approaches after having given their own spontaneous reasoning;
2) While overall frequency (aggregated three age groups and genders together) shows that a
relativistic approach was the second most frequently selected choice for both dilemmas,
participants selected the relativistic approach more in the video dilemma (26.2%) than the
homework dilemma (14.3%); and
3) An age- and gender-related (interaction) trend was found only in the video dilemma. There
were no age differences in selecting a relativistic approach among the male participants as there
were among the female participants. Younger female college students (aged 18-19) endorsed the
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relativistic approach more than the high school female students (aged 14-16) and older female
college students (aged 20-21). In short, regardless of age, the participants showed their
relativistic thinking, which partially support the hypothesis (“some older participants would
show moral relativism”).
These findings are taken to mean that many young people, at least by middle
adolescence, may have developed moral relativism as a fallback strategy. Whether there is a
gender-specific developmental path is not known. Further research is certainly needed to uncover
the nature of young people’s moral relativism. In future study, as Quintelier and Fessler (2012)
proposed, it is important to incorporating philosophers’ criteria and definitions of moral
relativism into psychological research.
Moral Comprehensiveness and Consistent Moral Thinking
In the current study, one of the aspects of moral comprehensiveness was defined as the
ability to assess multifaceted conflicting concerns/issues in terms of different perspectives,
specifically an ability to use both deontological and consequentialist approaches when resolving
a dilemma. Thus, the participants’ spontaneous reasoning was examined within a dilemma.
However, such moral comprehensiveness was not captured by the current method and definition,
and the hypothesis was not supported. That is, age- or gender-related trend in moral
comprehensiveness was not found for either dilemma.
When the participants’ choices between the two dilemmas were compared, some
participants showed their strict adherence to one type of approach (consistent moral thinking),
but there were no age or gender differences in the tendency. Rather, the majority of participants
selected different approaches across the two dilemmas (no-consistent [inconsistent] pattern).
This choice pattern was evidenced more in female participants. It is important to note that, from
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these findings, it is not clear whether one person’s “consistency” may be another’s “rigidity” or
whether one person’s “inconsistency” may be another’s “moral flexibility or
comprehensiveness.”
Conclusions
In sum, the current study suggests important implications with regard to young
people’s practical moral judgments. First, young people’s spontaneous decisions are not
restricted to the simple evaluative decisions (i.e., Yes, I do/No, I don’t). Rather, young people
conceptualize moral issues involved in a moral dilemma differently and make various types of
practical decisions.
Second, it appears that young people acknowledge different types of approaches to
frame their reasoning; however, which approach (i.e., deontological, consequentialist, or other
approaches) young people spontaneously use to frame their reasoning may depend on the nature
of moral issues (e.g., involvement of conflicting two perfect duties) and the context in which a
given moral dilemma is set. For instance, if a moral dilemma is difficult to resolve (e.g., the
video dilemma), young people may pay more attention to its contextual properties in order to try
to carefully assess the pros and cons of the consequences of their own actions, and then frame
their reasoning in terms of a consequentialist approach. By contrast, if a moral dilemma includes
a relatively simple contextual property (e.g., the homework dilemma), in addition to examining
the contextual properties of the moral dilemma, young people may also focus on moral issues
and maximally exert their ability to frame their reasoning in terms of more systematic ways such
as by using deontological principles. Although such an interpretation may be speculative, some
of the findings in the current study are consistent with this interpretation. Clearly further research
is needed. In particular, it is important to further examine whether and how different levels of
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complexity of moral issues involved in a moral dilemma affect young people’s reasoning (i.e.,
deontological, consequentialist, and other approaches).
Third, it appears that young people’s reasoning tends to be influenced by the
“intervention (i.e., nine fixed reasoning alternatives)” introduced by the researcher. The most
intriguing finding was that relativistic thinking was evidenced only when young people were
asked to select one from nine reasoning alternatives and evidenced more for the video dilemma.
Specifically, younger female college students (aged 18-19) tended to show more relativistic
thinking than the other female counterparts. Past findings on the development of “thinking
processes” (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000), in which more than half of undergraduates
showed radical relativism (i.e., multiplist level of epistemological understanding) when they
evaluated two simple contrasting claims, could partially explain the finding. Accordingly,
although further research is needed, it may be that young people’s endorsement of moral
relativism could be accounted for by dilemma complexity, exposure to the college
education/experience, and/or gender-specific cognitive style.
Lastly, developmentally, the ability (e.g., thinking about consequences of own actions)
to resolve interpersonal moral encounters in their everyday-life may not be dramatically different
between middle/late adolescents and young adults. However, given some interesting, if
unanticipated, findings regarding gender-related trends, it may be that there are gender-specific
paths for developing moral thinking, specifically female strategies involving the restructuring of
moral dilemmas/situations in ways that allow reasoners to refocus attention onto the underlying
issues involved and to represent the dilemma in more manageable form. Although this is
speculative, this pattern may involve a structural advance and also a defensive function in that it
allows the reasoner to avoid choosing between two “loyalties.” However, clearly further research
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is needed to delineate possible cognitive structures behind young people’s practical moral
judgments and uncover the developmental trajectory/ies involved.
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Table 1
Frequencies of Listed Items of Each Category (Study 1)
Age group
Content types (moral issues)

Aged 14-16

Aged 18-21

Total

Harm to other(s), group(s), Loyalty to groups, etc.

5

7

12

Truth/Lie

3

3

6

Promises/confidence

1

3

4

Apologies/confessions

3

1

4

Honesty/cheating/fraud

6

6

12

Theft

0

3

3

Racism/discrimination

1

0

1

Life preservation (life related issue)

0

2

2

Substance use

1

0

1

Animal welfare

1

0

1

Prosocial/help/altruism

0

4

4

Others

2

8

10

Note. N = 42. Contents of moral dilemmas were multiple-coded, when applicable.
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Age group
Context(s): social relationship with others

Aged 14-16

Aged 18-21

Total

Acquaintance(s)

1

0

1

Friend(s)

4

5

9

7

10

17

Co-worker (fellow) (fellow-student)

1

2

3

Parents/mother/father

4

3

7

Sibling(s)

1

1

2

Other relative

0

5

5

Teacher/professor

1

0

1

Strangers

1

3

4

Others

1

2

3

Aged 14-16

Aged 18-21

Total

Transgressor1

11

21

32

Victim/Accuser

2

1

3

Third person observer

3

4

7

Close (includes “Best friend”), intimate friend or
romantic partner

Note. N = 42. Context(s) were multiple-coded, when applicable.
Age group
Participant’s role in dilemma

Note.

1

Transgressor (e.g., tempted or committed moral transgressions). N = 42.
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Age group
Context(s): situation

Aged 14-16

Aged 18-21

Total

Home

3

6

9

School

7

8

15

Work Place

0

2

2

Camp, Circle, etc., Public gathering

1

0

1

Somewhere private place

0

5

5

Somewhere public place

2

2

4

No specific or others

3

3

6

(A place where a dilemma happened)

Note. N = 42.
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Table 2
A Coding System: Decision Categories and Description, Homework Dilemma
Category
Won’t stop/Keep showing

Description and Examples
Making a definitive decision
e.g., “Keep letting her copy my homework.”

Will stop showing

Making a definitive decision
e.g., “Tell Ashley to do her/his own work.” “Stop giving her
homework.”

Help/Compromising

Not making a definitive decision, but a compromised decision on
showing or not showing
e.g., “Do together.” “I offer to help him rather than let him
copy.” “Time to time is ok, but not always.” “I would tell Tom
that we should split the work lord.”

Alternative (Restructuring)

Shift-focusing on different part(s) of the dilemma, restructuring
the dilemma, proposing a stratagem [to get a friend to do right])
e.g., “Talk (to) her about (whether) it is the only good solution.”

Avoidance

Showing sheer/blatant avoidance of making a decision
e.g., “I will tell her I don’t have my homework with me.” “I
would make up the excuse that I did not do the homework.”

Relativistic decision

Making a relativistic decision (i.e., I can’t decide. It depends on
what you think.)

Miscellaneous
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Decision Categories and Description, Video Dilemma
Category

Description and Examples

Will tell the name

Making a definitive decision

(Patrick/Sandra) to Jessica

e.g., “Tell her it was Patrick that told me.” “Tell Jessica the truth.”

Won’t tell the name

Making a definitive decision

(Patrick/Sandra) to Jessica

e.g., “I won’t tell her who did it.” “I will keep the secret for
Sandra.”

Alternative

Focusing on different part(s) of the dilemma, restructuring the

(Restructuring)

dilemma, proposing a stratagem for an alternative resolution
e.g., “I would tell Jessica not to try to find out who told me about
the video, but to talk to the person who made the video and is
showing it to other people.”
“I would ask Jessica why she sent the tape and why it mattered
who told me.”

Avoidance

Showing sheer/blatant avoidance of making a decision
e.g., “I overheard the rumor in a conversation, and that I don’t
know who exactly said that there was a video.”

Relativistic

Making a relativistic decision (e.g., I can’t decide. It depends on
what you think.)

Miscellaneous

e.g., “He must do his own work to receive credit.”

(Deontological/Rule, D/R)

copy.” “She has the right to know what others have on video of her.”
Not fitting in any of above two subcategories
e.g., “It’s illegal.”

(Deontological/Fairness, D/F)

Other1

(Deontological/Other, D/O)

Jessica] in the video dilemma)

(Consequentialist/Individuals, C/I)

General, Social

in the homework dilemma

(Consequentialist/Individuals [Practical], C/IP)

Consequences to general

on tests/quizzes.” “He wouldn’t learn anything.”

e.g., “She needs to do her own work to learn the material and do well

Consequences to others’ (i.e., Tom/Ashley’) academic performance

Individuals (Practical)2

“I wouldn’t want to start drama between two friends.”

e.g., “Neither of you gets caught.” “

Consequences to self or relationship, (or others [Patrick, Sandra,

Individuals

Consequentialist

e.g., “It’s unfair. Other students and I worked hard and she makes a

Trust, etc.

Fairness, Rights, Justice, Respect, Responsibility, Concern for fairness, rights, justice, respect, responsibility, trust, etc.

“I should keep the secret for Sandra.”

Concern for rule, social or moral order

Description

Rule, Social or Moral order

Deontological

Category (Variable Name, Abbreviation)

Reasoning Categories and Description (Homework and Video Dilemmas)

Table 3
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Motivation central to special concern to friendship/social relations
e.g., “Because he is my friend.”
Not fitting in any of categories, but interesting reasonable
thoughts/explanation (e.g., Shift-focusing, Reasonable thoughts)

Motivational Force

(Motivation)

Other Thoughts

(Others)

Incoherent responses

Jessica’s decision making.”

maybe hearing an outsider’s perspective (meaning me) may aid in

she does not understand the homework that has been going.” “I think

3

“Misc.” “Relativistic” was dropped from subsequent analyses.

Note. 1 Only one response (in video dilemma) fit with the category. 2 “Individuals (Practical)” was created only for homework dilemma.

Misc.3

e.g., “I’m a very upfront person.” “

(Virtue)

“I would ask her that because either she wants the easy way out or

Center on moral character

Can’t decide. It depends on what you think.

Virtue

(Relativistic)

Relativistic3

e.g., “So that I could say my phone wasn’t on or my internet has

(Avoidance)
broken as an excuse.” “Don’t get involved.”

Amoral thinking/stance

“The truth will always make the situation better.”

e.g., “Cheating has never helped anyone achieve anything in life.”

Avoidance

(Consequentialist/General, C/GS)
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22
17
39
51.3
18
27
45
50
16
20
36
52.9
120
51.3

1
3
4
4.4
1
1
2
2.9
11
4.7

Will stop

3
2
5
6.6

Won’t stop

5
14
19
27.9
68
29.1

9
14
23
25.6

12
14
26
34.2

Help/
Compromising

5
5
10
14.7
30
12.8

5
12
17
18.9

2
1
3
3.9

Alternative
(Restructuring)

Decision Category

0
1
1
1.5
5
2.1

0
1
1
1.1

0
3
3
3.9

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

Avoidance Relativistic

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

Misc.

Note. N = 234. Avoidance, Relativistic, and Miscellaneous were dropped for further analyses. % = within participants’ age group.

Aged 14-16
Male
Female
Total
%
Aged 18-19
Male
Female
Total
%
Aged 20-21
Male
Female
Total
%
Total
f
% of total

Age/Gender Group

Homework Dilemma

Frequencies of Participants’ Spontaneous Decisions by Age and Gender

Table 4
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40

Total

95
40.6

f

% of total

19.7

46

25.0

17

12

5

18.9

17

12

5

15.8

12

8

4

Won’t tell

28.2

66

27.9

19

15

4

36.7

33

22

11

18.4

14

11

3

(Restructuring)

Alternative

11.1

26

10.3

7

3

4

10.0

9

7

2

13.2

10

5

5

Avoidance

Decision Category

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Relativistic

0.4

1

1.5

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Misc.

Note. N = 234. Relativistic and Miscellaneous were dropped and excluded from further analyses. % within participants’ age group.

Total

24

Total
35.3

11

Female

%

13

Male

Aged 20-21

31

Total
34.4

16

Female

%

15

Male

52.6

13

Female

%

27

Will tell

Male

Aged 18-19

Age14-16

Age/Gender Group

Video Dilemma

68
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Table 5
Frequencies and Percentages of Participants’ Spontaneous Decisions (all participants together)
Homework Dilemma
Decision Category
Won’t stop

Will stop

Help/

Alternative

Compromising

(Restructuring)

f

11

120

68

30

%

4.8

52.4

29.7

13.1
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Table 6
Frequencies, Percentages, Expected Frequencies of Participants’ Spontaneous Decisions by
Gender
Video Dilemma
Decision Category
Gender

Will tell

Won’t tell

Alternative

Avoidance

(Restructuring)
Male

Female

Note.

f

55

14

18

11

%

56.1

14.3

18.4

11.2

Expected f

40

19.3

27.8

10.9

f

40

32

48

15

%

29.6

23.7

35.6

11.1

Expected f

55

26.7

38.2

15.1

% = within participants’ gender.

6
16

Female

Total

1
1

Female

Total

1
1
18

Female

Total

Total 266

74

25

16

9

37

28

9

12

9

3

41

7

4

3

17

10

7

17

5

12

89

36

20

16

34

20

14

19

9

10

3

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

1

0

Consequentialist
C/IP
C/GS

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

2

1

Avoida
nce

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Relativi
stica

Reasoning Category

4

0

0

0

3

2

1

1

0

1

Others
Virtue

15

3

2

1

6

4

2

6

5

1

Motivat
ional

14

5

3

2

5

5

0

4

4

0

Other
Though
ts

5

0

0

0

1

0

1

4

1

3

Misc.a

from further analyses. 13.73% (N = 32) of participants contributed more than one category.

C/IP (Consequentialist/Individuals[practical]), C/GS (Consequentialist/General, Social). aTwo categories were dropped and excluded

Note. N = 233. D/R (Deontological/Rule, Social or Moral order), D/F (Deontological/Fairness, etc.), C/I (Consequentialist/Individuals),

0

Male

Aged 20-21

0

Male

Aged 18-19

10

Deontological
D/R
D/F
C/I

Male

Aged 14-16

Age/Gender Group

Homework Dilemma

Frequencies of Participants’ Spontaneous Reasoning by Age and Gender

Table 7
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6
9

Female

Total

8
10

Female

Total

8
11
30

Female

Total

Total 253

46

12

6

6

21

13

8

13

6

7

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

92

25

19

6

38

26

12

29

15

14

2

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

1

Consequentialist
C/I
C/GS

11

6

2

4

1

1

0

4

2

2

Avoida
nce

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Relativi
stica

Reasoning Category

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Others
Virtuea

23

7

3

4

8

6

2

8

4

4

Motivat
ional

35

12

7

5

17

10

7

6

5

1

Other
Though
ts

13

0

0

0

4

0

4

9

3

6

Misc.a

analyses. 8.12% (N = 19) of participants contributed more than one category.

(Consequentialist/Individuals), C/GS (Consequentialist/General, Social). a Three categories were dropped and excluded from further

Note. N = 234. D/R (Deontological/Rule, Social or Moral order), D/F (Deontological/Fairness, etc.), D/O (Deontological/Others), C/I

3

Male

Aged 20-21

2

Male

Aged 18-19

3

Deontological
D/R
D/F
D/O

Male

Aged 14-16

Age/Gender Group

Video dilemma
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Table 8
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Likelihood of Using a Particular Reasoning
Category
Homework Dilemma
Predictor

B

SE

OR

95% CI

Wald

p

Statistic
Deontological/Rule (D/R)
Age

15.13

.001*

Age (1)

2.84

1.05

17.04

[2.19, 132.84]

7.37

.007*

Age (2)

-.29

1.42

.75

[.05, 12.16]

.04

.84

Gender

.29

.53

1.33

[.47, 3.74]

.30

.59

10.94

.004*

Deontological Fairness (D/F)
Age
Age (1)

-1.09

.41

.34

[.15, .75]

7.12

.008*

Age (2)

.15

.34

1.16

[.60, 2.24]

.19

.66

Gender

-.77

.31

.46

[.25, .85]

6.15

.01*

12.60

.002*

Consequentialist Individuals (Practical) (C/IP)
Age
Age (1)

-1.29

.37

.27

[.13, .56]

12.56

.000*

Age (2)

-. 65

.33

.52

[.28, 1.00]

3.86

.049*

Gender

.31

.28

1.36

[.78, 2.37]

1.17

.28

Note. CI = confidence interval for odds ratio (OR). Age (1) = aged 14-16. Age (2) = aged 18-19.
Reference group = aged 20-21. Reference group for gender is female.

2
1
3
4.4
20
8.7

2
2
4
4.4

10
3
13
18.1

2
2
4
5.9
17
7.4

4
3
7
7.8

2
4
6
8.3

D/F

0
1
1
1.5
15
6.5

3
1
4
4.4

7
3
10
13.9

N = 230. % = within participants’ age group. D/R: deontological-rule/social or moral order,

Male
Female
Total
%
f
% of total

Male
Female
Total
%

Male
Female
Total
%

D/R

Type of Reasoning Approach
C/I

19
31
50
73.5
145
63.0

17
41
58
64.4

16
21
37
51.4

C/O

D/F: deontological-fairness/rights/justice/respect, etc., C/I : consequentialist-for-self, C/O: consequentialist-for-others.

Note.

Total

Aged 20-21

Aged 18-19

Aged 14-16

Age/Gender Group

Homework Dilemma

Frequencies and Percentages of Participants’ Choice of Reasoning Approach

Table 9

4
6
10
14.7
33
14.3

7
10
17
18.9

3
3
6
8.3

Relativistic
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6
7
13
19.1
32
13.7

2
7
9
10.0

2
8
10
13.3

10
27
37
54.4
121
51.9

17
24
41
45.6

28
15
43
57.3

D/F

0
1
1
1.5
5
2.1

2
1
3
3.3

1
0
1
1.3

N = 233. % = within participants’ age group. D/R: deontological-rule/social or moral order,

Male
Female
Total
%
f
% of total

Male
Female
Total
%

Male
Female
Total
%

D/R

Type of Reasoning Approach
C/I

2
1
3
4.4
14
6.0

4
3
7
7.8

2
2
4
5.3

C/O

D/F: deontological-fairness/rights/justice/respect, etc., C/I : consequentialist-for-self, C/O: consequentialist-for-others.

Note.

Total

Aged 20-21

Aged 18-19

Aged 14-16

Age/Gender Group

Video Dilemma

9
5
14
20.6
61
26.2

8
22
30
33.3

6
11
17
22.7

Relativistic

75

76
Table 10
Frequencies and Percentages of Participants’ Choice Patterns
Choice Pattern
Gender
Male

Female

Note.

Consistent

Non-consistent

fo

37

61

fe

28.5

69.6

% within gender

37.8

62.2

fo

30

102

fe

38.5

93.5

% within gender

22.7

77.3

fo = observed frequency, fe = expected frequency.

1.10

1.59

.87

SD

M

SD

1.12

1.96

1.15

3.20

Aged 18-19

1.00

1.84

1.04

3.06

Aged 20-21

Aged 14-16

1.02

1.80

1.10

3.18

1.77

4.05

Video Dilemma

1.54

5.45

Homework Dilemma

Total

1.70

3.57

1.46

4.71

Aged 18-19

1.83

3.82

1.64

4.72

Aged 20-21

Difficulty to Resolve

1.76

3.80

1.57

4.95

Total

Somewhat easy, 6: Moderately easy, 7: Very easy).

often). Difficulty was measured by 7-point Likart scale (1: Very difficult, 2: Moderately difficult, 3: Somewhat difficult, 4: Neither, 5:

Personal relevance was measured by 5-point Likart scale (1: Never, 2: Rarely, 3: Every once in a while, 4: Sometimes, 5: Very

3.25

M

Note.

Aged 14-16

Age group

Personal Relevance

Means and Standard Deviations of Ratings for Personal Relevance and Difficulty by Age

Table 11
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Male

3.09

1.07

1.72

.97

Gender

M

SD

M

SD

Male

1.62

5.13

1.05

1.87
1.83

4.02

Video Dilemma

1.12

3.24

1.70

3.64

1.52

4.82

Female

Difficulty to Resolve

Homework Dilemma

Female

Personal Relevance

Means and Standard Deviations of Ratings for Personal Relevance and Difficulty by Gender
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Appendix A
Written Form (Study 1)

Share your real-life moral dilemmas
Purpose of this study: The purpose of this study is to collect a number of real-life moral
dilemmas experienced by young people in their everyday lives. Some of the dilemmas we collect
in this study will be used in a second study. That study will look at the ways young people make
moral decisions.
Confidentiality: All of the dilemma you share with us will be anonymous.
! Your name will never be used.
!

An ID number will be used on the form instead of your name.

!

All identifying features of your story (for example, the names of people, schools, shops,
and locations) will be changed.

!

We also ask that you use fictitious or made-up names when you describe your dilemma at
interview.

Your Task
Describe one moral dilemma involving yourself and another person that you have experienced
in the past one year.
Steps you will take
Step 1:

Write or type your dilemma on the form provided and answer the three questions at the
end of the form.
" Please do not share your dilemma or answers with others during this process
because we are interested in your opinions and thoughts.
" Make up names for the people involved in your dilemma.

Step 2:

Answer all the questions on the Background Information Questionnaire since we want
to get a sample of dilemmas from people of your age from many different backgrounds.

Step 3:

Mail the documents back to Ms. Takagi by June 28, 2011
! Use the enclosed envelope to mail the forms and questionnaire to Ms. Yoko Takagi by
June. 28, 2011. Please e-mail Ms. Yoko Takagi (yt@cuny.edu) to notify her that you
have mailed your documents.

Ms. Takagi may contact you via-e-mail for an interview schedule if she needs to clarify your
description of moral dilemma and/or wants to know more about your moral dilemma. If you have
any questions about this research, please contact Yoko Takagi at 1-234-567-8910 or at
yt@cuny.edu. You may also contact Professor Herbert Saltzstein at 1-987-654-3210 or
hs@cumy.edu.
Thank you for your time and cooperation.
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PARTICIPANT ID:

-

-

Your Dilemma
Please describe a situation that happened within the last year in which you were not sure what
was the morally “right” or “correct” thing to do. That is, please describe a situation in which it
was not just hard to do the right thing, but even what the right thing to do was.
In your description, be sure to mention what happened, with whom (what was your
relationship), where it happened, and how and when it happened. Please be as detailed as you
can without revealing anyone’s identity.
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PARTICIPANT ID:

If you need more space to write, please use the other side.

-

-
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PARTICIPANT ID:

-

-

Answer following questions about your dilemma:
1. What did you see as the moral or other issues involved in the dilemma? Please explain and
describe in detail.

2. a) How did you end up resolving the dilemma?

b) Please explain why you resolved it in this way.

c) Using the scale below, rate how satisfied/dissatisfied you felt about how the dilemma was
resolved. Circle the number.
1

2

3

4

5

Very Dissatisfied

Somewhat Dissatisfied

Neither Satisfied nor
Dissatisfied

Somewhat Satisfied

Very Satisfied

d) Briefly explain why you felt this way about how the dilemma was resolved.

3. List as many thoughts as possible that you had while you were trying to resolve this dilemma.
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PARTICIPANT ID:

-

-

22

23

Background Information Questionnaire
Please answer following questions.
1) What is your age? [Circle one] 14

15

16

2) When is your birthday? MM/DD/YYYY:

17

18

/

3) Please indicate your gender. [Circle one]

Male

19

20

21

/

Female

4) Please indicate your ethnic group. [Circle one]
A: White
B: Hispanic or Latino
C: African American or Black
D: Asian
E: Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
F: Native American or Alaskan Native
G: Other (please specify:

) or Prefer not to say

5) Please indicate parental education, by their highest degree.
Father A: High school degree
D: Master’s degree

E: Ph.D. or Professional degree

Mother A: High school degree
D: Master’s degree

B: Associates’ degree (2 year college) C: College degree
F: No degree

G: N/A

B: Associates’ degree (2 year college) C: College degree

E: Ph.D. or Professional degree

F: No degree

G: N/A

6) [Optional] What is your religious affiliation? (

)

7) Will it be alright for the researchers (Takagi and Saltzstein) to contact you for a further study
which will be conducted within a few months? [Circle one]

Yes

Thank you so much for your participation and time.

No
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Appendix B
A Coding System: Everyday Life Moral Dilemmas (Study 1)
ID:
Age: 1: Younger Group, 2: Older Group
Gender: 1: Male; 2: Female
Ethnic Group: 1: White, 2: Hispanic or Latino, 3: African American or Black, 4: Asian, 5:
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, 6: Native American or Alaskan Native, 7: Other (

)

1) Content types (Moral (positive/negative) issues) (Multiple-coded if applicable)
1: Harm to other(s)/group(s), (including Loyalty to others/groups/family)
2: Truth/Lie 3: Promises/confidences, 4: Apologies/confessions, 5: Honesty/cheating/fraud, 6:
Theft, 7: Racism/discrimination, 8: Life preservation (life related issue), 9: Abortion, 10:
Premarital sex, 11: Substance use, 12: Abuse (child, sexual), 13: Animal welfare, 14:
Prosocial/help/altruism, 15: Others
(The category types are modified from Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, & Matsuba [1995].)
2) Contexts: Social relationship with others

(Multiple-coded if applicable)

1: Acquaintance(s), 2: Friend(s), 3: Close (includes “Best Friend”), intimate friend or romantic
partner, 4: Co-worker (fellow)(Fellow-student), 5: Parents/mother/father, 6: Sibling(s), 7:
Other relative, 8: Teacher/professor, 9: Strangers, 10: Others
(Some categories are cited from Johnston, Brown, & Christopherson [1990].)
3) Participant’s role
1: Transgressor (e.g., tempted or committed moral transgressions), 2: Victim/Accuser (e.g.,
could be negatively affected by the other’s transgression), 3: Third person observer
(Referred from Krebs, Denton, Wark, Couch, Racine, & Krebs, 2002).
4) Context: Situation (Where)
1: Home, 2: School, 3: Work Place, 4: Camp, Circle, etc. Public gathering
5: Somewhere private place, 6: Somewhere public place, 99: No specific or others
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PARTICIPANT ID:

-

-

Form 1
Appendix C
Questionnaire (Study 2)

The questionnaire consists of Two Parts: Part 1 and Part 2. Please answer Both
Parts of the questionnaire and the Background Information Questionnaire at
the end.
We are interested in “Your thoughts!”
much as you can. Thank you!

Please clearly answer each question as

Please use the other side of sheets if you need more space to write your answer.
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PARTICIPANT ID:

-

-

Part 1: You will read two moral dilemmas: “Homework dilemma” and “Video dilemma.” Read each
dilemma and answer each question. Please imagine that “YOU” are actually experiencing the
situations.
Homework Dilemma
This year at school I have been in many situations in which my pretty close friend, Tom, has asked me
to give him the answers to our homework to get credits. I have let him copy my work. Because he is my
pretty close friend, I want to help him out as best I can. Now he has gotten into a habit of relying on
me.
I start wondering what is the “right” or “correct” thing to do.
Now you have to resolve the dilemma.
1) How would you resolve this dilemma?

2) Why? Explain your reasons.

3) List as many thoughts/considerations that you had while you were trying to resolve this dilemma.
Please use short sentences when giving your answers.

4) Have you ever experienced a similar situation? Circle the number.
1
Never

2
Rarely

3
Every once in a while

4
Sometimes

5
Very often

5) How difficult was it to resolve the dilemma? Circle the number. Also please explain why.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very
Moderately Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat Moderately
Very
difficult
difficult
difficult
easy
easy
easy
Why?
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PARTICIPANT ID:

-

-

Video Dilemma
My friend, Patrick, secretly told me that he had seen a sex video of my friend, Jessica. When I first
heard this, I simply assumed that Jessica had merely begun a relationship with the student who owned
the video. But I was confused about why this was the first time I heard about the relationship.
Since Jessica and I were close friends, I decided to ask her whether she had started a new relationship
with someone. She asked me why I was asking. So, I told her that I heard a rumor about the video
involving her. Jessica seemed to be more upset with who (Patrick) told me about the video than who
showed it to Patrick.
Now, Jessica is pressing me as to who had told me about the video.
I have trouble in deciding what is the “right” or “correct” thing to do.
Now you have to resolve the dilemma.
1) How would you resolve this dilemma?

2) Why? Explain your reasons.

3) List as many thoughts/considerations that you had while you were trying to resolve this dilemma.
Please use short sentences when giving your answers.

4) Have you ever experienced a similar situation? Circle the number.
1
Never

2
Rarely

3
Every once in a while

4
Sometimes

5
Very often

5) How difficult was it to resolve the dilemma? Circle the number. Also please explain why.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very
Moderately Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat Moderately
Very
difficult
difficult
difficult
easy
easy
easy
Why?
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PARTICIPANT ID:

-

-

Part 2: Nine young people made their own decisions and gave their reasoning (see below) about the
“Homework dilemma” and the “Video dilemma” you already resolved in Part 1. Read all arguments
first, and then pick one person’s argument that you most agree with. 1) Indicate the person’s number. 2)
Briefly explain why you most agree with the person’s argument.
Homework Dilemma
I will keep showing my homework to him, because…
Person 1: showing my homework to a friend is not really “cheating.”
Person 2: friendship means helping one another.
Person 3: I want to stay a close friend with him.
Person 4: he needs to keep up his grades.
I will stop showing my homework to him, because…
Person 5: copying homework is “cheating.”
Person 6: helping him is not fair to the other students.
Person 7: I don’t want to get caught.
Person 8: I want my friend to learn the materials by himself.
There is no “right” or “wrong” here, because…
Person 9: it depends on what you think.
1) Who’s argument do you most agree with? Circle the number.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

8

9

2) Why? Briefly explain.

Video Dilemma
I will tell the name (Patrick) to Jessica, because…
Person 1: my obligation to Jessica should always take priority.
Person 2: Jessica has a right to know who spread the rumor.
Person 3: I will be able to keep Jessica as my close friend.
Person 4: Jessica will be able to improve her relationship with her boyfriend.
I won’t tell the name (Patrick) to Jessica, because…
Person 5: a promise should be always kept.
Person 6: keeping the promise shows respect for Patrick.
Person 7: Patrick will not be disappointed with me.
Person 8: Patrick will not get into trouble.
There is no “right” or “wrong” here, because…
Person 9: it depends on what you think.
1) Who’s argument do you most agree with? Circle the number.
1

2

2) Why? Briefly explain.

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix D
Original Nine Arguments and Five Categories (Part 2)
Homework dilemma
Arguments

Approach (abbreviation)

Showing my homework to a friend is

Deontological-rule/social or moral

not really “cheating.”

order (D/R)

Deontological
Approach

Copying homework is cheating.
Friendship means helping one

Deontological-fairness/rights/justice/

another.

respect, etc. (D/F)

Helping him/her is not fair to the
other students.
I want to stay a close friend with

Consequentialist-for-self (C/I)

him/her.

Consequential
ist Approach

I don’t want to get caught.
He/she needs to keep up his/her

Consequentialist-for-others (C/O)

grades.
I want my friend to learn the
materials by himself/herself.
It depends on what you think.

Relativistic

Relativistic
Approach
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Video dilemma
Arguments

Approach (abbreviation)

My obligation to Jessica should

Deontological-rule/social or moral

always take priority.

order (D/R)

Deontological
Approach

A promise should be always kept.
Jessica has a right to know who

Deontological-fairness/rights/justice/

spread the rumor.

respect, etc. (D/F)

Keeping the promise shows respect
for Patrick/Sandra.
I will be able to keep Jessica as my

Consequentialist-for-self (C/I)

close friend.

Consequential
ist Approach

Patrick/Sandra will not be
disappointed with me.
Jessica will be able to improve her

Consequentialist-for-others (C/O)

relationship with her boyfriend.
Sandra will not get into trouble.
It depends on what you think.

Relativistic

Relativistic
Approach
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